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I. INTRODUCTION
The underdeveloped nations of Latin America, Africa, Asia,
and Eastern Europe suffer from similar human rights problems
and abuses. Large segments of the populations of these Third
World states live in widespread poverty,' which contributes to
1. See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CENTRAL AMERICA RECOVERY AND DE-
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political instability. Population pressures are often high,2 litera-
cy rates are low,3 access to education is limited,4 and many peo-
ple face daily misery, injustice and exploitation.' Social and eco-
nomic oppression gives rise to political oppression, which may
result in ruthless violations of human rights.' Moreover, much
of the population has no means of redress for these violations.
Some Third World states are still governed by the rule of
man rather than by the rule of law.' In states governed by dic-
tatorships or controlled by the military, disappearances, summa-
ry executions, and torture may be employed by the government
to intimidate the population and maintain control.8 In many na-
VELOPMENT, POVERTY, CONFLICT AND HOPE: A TURNING POINT IN LATIN AMERICA
(Report for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate)
(1989) [hereinafter POVERTY, CONFLICT AND HOPE].
2. As of 1990, Africa's population was 642,580,000 with an estimated average
increase between the years 1990-2000 of 2.9% per annum; Asia had a population of
3,117,842,000 with an annual increase of 1.7%; Latin America and the Caribbean
had a population of 441,066,000 with an annual increase of 1.7%. UNESCO, 39 STA-
TISTICAL YEARBOOK, 1-5 (1994). See generally Enrique Carrasco, Law, Hierarchy and
Vulnerable Groups in Latin America: Toward a Communal Model of Development in
a Neo-Liberal World, STAN. J. INT'L L. 221, 315-24 (1994) (providing graphs on Latin
American income, education, literacy, unemployment, etc.).
3. Of the 948 million illiterates over the age of fifteen estimated for 1990, ten
countries account for 705 million, or 74.3% of the world's illiterate population - six
are in Asia, three are in Africa, and one is in Latin America. India had an illiteracy
rate of 51.8%, China 26.7%, Pakistan 65.2%, Bangladesh 64.7%, Indonesia 23.0%,
Iran 46%, Nigeria 49.3%, Egypt 51.6%, Sudan 72.9%, and Brazil 18.9%. UNESCO
26:31 COMPENDIUM OF STATISTICS ON ILLITERACY 9 (1990).
4. In 1989, the richest 20% of the population in Latin America received nearly
50% of all educational subsidies, while the poorest 20% received only 5%. Moreover,
per student expenditure at the primary level in Latin America fell from 28% to 1.1%
of the gross national product during the 1980s. Due to the poor quality of education,
29% of Latin American students repeat every year of their primary education.
UNESCO 26:31 COMPENDIUM OF STATISTICS ON ILLITERACY 1 (1990).
5. Hector Gros Espiell, La Convencidn Americana y La Convencidn Europea de
Derechos Humanos, Andlisis Comparativo, [The American Convention and the Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights, A Comparative Analysis) 1991 ED. JURIDICA DE
CHILE 35; see generally POVERTY, CONFLICT AND HOPE, supra note 1.
6. Fernando Volio, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 30 AM.
U. L. REV. 65, 72-73 (1980); see Angela Cornell & Kenneth Roberts, Democracy,
Counterinsurgency, and Human Rights: The Case of Peru, 12 HuM. RTS. Q. 529, 533-
35 (1990).
7. See THOMAS G. PATERSON, CONTESTING CASTRO: THE UNITED STATES AND
THE TRIUMPH OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION (1994); Karen DeWitt, Prominent Black
Americans Take Aim at Nigeria, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1995, at A10. See generally
Carlos Santiago Nino, Transition to Democracy, Corporatism and Constitutional Re-
form in Latin America, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 129 (1989).
8. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE TRUTH FOR EL SALVADOR, FROM MAD-
NESS TO HOPE: THE 12-YEAR WAR IN EL SALVADOR, U. N. Doc. s/25500 (1993) [here-
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tions where dictators or military regimes have fallen or relin-
quished power, fledgling democracies have made major
concessions to the former rulers in order to maintain a precari-
ous hold on power.9 These democratically elected governments
often pass amnesty laws granting immunity from prosecution to
those who committed gross and systematic human rights viola-
tions under previous regimes." Consequently, the victims may
have no remedy, and the perpetrators go unpunished.
The inter-American human rights system, the first such
fully functioning system in an underdeveloped region, has estab-
lished several innovative approaches to protect and ensure hu
man rights. Thus, an analysis and evaluation of the system's
inafter U.N. TRUTH COMMISSION REPORT FOR EL SALVADOR] (stating that one focus
of the Commission's investigation was a series of individual cases that revealed a
systematic pattern of violence meant to intimidate certain sectors of society); THE
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON DISAPPEARANCES OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSIONER FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONDURAS: THE FACTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES
216-17 (Human Rights Watch/Americas (formerly America's Watch) trans., 1994)
(abridged English translation of Los Hechos Hablan Por Si Mismo: Informe
Preliminar Sobre Los Desaparecidos en Honduras 1980-1993 (1994)) [hereinafter, THE
FACTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES]. See also Tim Weiner, Guatemalan Agent of the
C.IA. Linked to Killing of American, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1995, at Al; Tim Weiner,
Long Road to Truth on Guatemala Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1995, at A3.
9. See Jaime Malamud-Goti, Trying Violators of Human Rights: The Dilemma
of Transitional Democratic Governments, in JUSTICE AND SOC'Y PROGRAM OF THE
ASPEN INST., STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON, PAPERS AND REPORTS OF A
CONFERENCE 23 (1989) [hereinafter STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON]; Jose
Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments:
Principles Applicable and Political Constraints, Id. at 23; Juan Mendez & Cynthia
Brown, Amnesty Laws in the Southern Cone: Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, 4 HUM. RTS.
WATCH NEWSL. 3-4 (Dec. 1989) cited in AMERICAS WATCH REPORT, ACCOUNTABILITY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON THE
TRUTH FOR EL SALVADOR 5 (1993); Carlos Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of
Human Rights Put in Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619 (1991); Jo
Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth: Truth Commissions, Impu-
nity and the Inter-American Human Rights System, 12 B.U. INYr'L L.J. 321, 344-45
(1994).
10. President Radl Alfonsin of Argentina, who was democratically elected to
office following the military's "dirty war," passed two amnesty laws and issued a
decree of pardon. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ARGENTINA: THE MILITARY JUNTA AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 94 (1987); El Salvador passed an amnesty law only five days after
the official truth commission report naming several prominent leaders as human
rights violators was released. See Thomas Buergenthal, The United Nations Truth
Commission for El Salvador, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 497, 537-38 (1984). See
generally Robert Norris, Leyes de Impunidad y los Derechos Humanos en Las Ameri-
cas: Una Respuesta Legal [Laws of Impunity and Human Rights in the Americas: A
Legal Response], 15 INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS REVISTA 47
(1992).
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significant developments and limitations may provide important
lessons for other regions. Significantly, the American Convention
on Human Rights 1 provides greater access to the system for
the poor and intimidated. 2 In urgent cases, the system may
minimize delay and provide relief by allowing the Inter-Amer-
ican Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court or Court) to
immediately order provisional measures at the request of the
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, (Inter-American
Commission or Commission) even before a case is before the
Court."3 Provisional measures may consist of ordering a state to
protect those whose lives are in danger. In addition, the Court's
balancing of victims' rights with procedural regularity and the
liberalization of evidentiary rules in cases before the Court helps
to prevent the intentional obstruction of justice. 4 The Inter-
American Court is an example of the contributions a regional
court can make to advance the protection of human rights. The
Court has, however, recently ignored some of its positive prece-
dents. Moreover, at times it appears to neglect unique opportu-
nities to develop the jurisprudence of international human rights
law and to establish clear criteria which will assist in the resolu-
tion of future related controversies. 5
Generally, states comply with the Inter-American Court's
judgments and orders of provisional measures. Perhaps as im-
portantly, the referral of a case to the Court appears to have a
chilling effect on human rights abuses. States do not, however,
easily relinquish their sovereignty. Instead, they continue to
place impediments in the road to human rights enforcement.
These impediments must also be considered and explored in any
11. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673,
OEA/ser.K/XVL/I.1, doe. 65 rev. 1 corr. 1 (1970) (entered into force July 18, 1978)
[hereinafter American Convention], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OAS/ser.LIV/II.82, doe. 6. rev. 1, 25
(1992) [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS).
12. See infra parts III.B.1 & 2.
13. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 63(2).
14. See infra part IV.B.2 & 3.
15. See, e.g., Genie Lacayo Case, May 18, 1995, Order of the Inter-American
Court (Art. 54(3)), American Convention on Human Rights (to be reprinted in Annu-
al Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1995)). In dissent, Judge
Cancado Trindade complained that the Court failed to take advantage of a unique
opportunity to clarify difficult issues concerning the scope of preliminary objections,
their relationship to the merits, and the composition of the Court during the differ-
ent phases of a case. Id. (Judge Cancado Trindade, dissenting).
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developing system.
Part II of this article provides a brief history of the develop-
ment of international human rights law. Part III outlines the
structure of the inter-American human rights system. Part III
also considers the system's human rights problems and analyzes
innovative American Convention provisions addressing these
problems. Part IV and V analyze jurisprudential, procedural,
and evidentiary precedents set by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and evaluate the effectiveness of the Court to
date. Finally, part VI focuses on current state actions that limit
the power of the enforcement organs in the inter-American hu-
man rights system. Although the system is not perfect, the effec-
tiveness of certain of its innovative approaches in dealing with
common human rights problems make it a worthy model for the
developing systems of Africa and Asia, and even for the expand-
ing European system."6
II. BRIEF BACKGROUND ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
No strong historical basis exists for the protection of an
individual's human rights from violations by his or her own
government. A state's treatment of its nationals was tradition-
ally a matter of state sovereignty. This doctrine allows a state
almost complete freedom to act within its domestic jurisdiction
and forbids external interference into its domestic affairs.17 The
vague and often arbitrary doctrine of humanitarian intervention
permits states to forcibly intervene in the territory of another
state to protect the nationals of that state, but the doctrine is
seldom utilized except for political reasons. 8 The traditional
16. As a result of the political changes in Eastern Europe, many of the nations
of the former Soviet Bloc have joined the Council of Europe and have ratified or are
preparing to ratify the European Convention. These nations, which include Poland,
Hungary, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, do not have recent experience with de-
mocracy. Their inclusion in the European human rights system could result in un-
expected problems for the European human rights institutions. Herbert Golsong, On
the Reform of the Supervisory System of the European Convention on Human Rights,
13 HUM. RTS. L.J. 265, 265-66 (1992); Rely Ryssdal, The Future of the European
Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe, ECOUR 90296.AB, at 4 (1990). Lessons
learned in the inter-American system may prove relevant in dealing with the human
rights problems of these emerging democracies.
17. See generally PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS
11 (1983); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287-97 (1990).
18. BRowNLIE, supra note 17, at 564-65. For a discussion of the doctrine of hu-
[Vol. 26:2
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international belief in non-intervention began to change, howev-
er, immediately after World War II when the world community
reacted with horror to the revelations of human rights atrocities
perpetrated by the Nazis. As a result, nations became more
willing to intercede in the affairs of other states, and a move-
ment grew to establish a universal human rights standard.
Unfortunately, the initial attempts to develop human rights
protections did not live up to some expectations. In 1945, the
victors of World War II drafted the Charter of the United Na-
tions with the intention of including provisions on human rights
protection.19 The resulting provisions, however, were not as pro-
tective as many believed necessary. Regrettably, the primary
world powers had their own human rights problems to consider:
the United States practiced dejure racial discrimination, France
and Great Britain still had colonial empires, and the Soviet
Union had its gulag.2" Consequently, a need remained for more
specific treaties to strengthen the protection of human rights.
The United Nations responded to this need by drafting two such
international treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights21 and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights,22 neither of which was opened for
signature until 1966. Both treaties have since been widely rati-
fied. 3 In the meantime, two regional organizations also drafted
human rights treaties that focused on each region's particular
manitarian intervention, see generally Tom J. Farer, An Inquiry into the Legitimacy
of Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL OR-
DER 185 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer, eds. 1991).
19. See Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No.
993, 3 Bevans 1153, arts. 1(3), 55 & 56, (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945) reprinted
in BARRY CARTER & PHILLIP TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS
AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS 3, 4, 16, 17 (1994) [hereinafter CARTER & TRIMBLE].
20. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS 18 (1988).
21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, GA Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N.
Doec. A/6316 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 61 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (entered into force Jan.
3, 1976).
22. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at
49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967).
23. Through the ratification of international treaties, states place the subject
matter of the treaty in the realm of international law, and limit their sovereignty to
act freely in relation to it within their domestic jurisdictions. See generally
SIEGHART, supra note 17, at 11; BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 287-97. Thus, states
agree to limit their sovereignty by relinquishing some power over their nationals and
allowing international organs to ultimately oversee their protection.
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problems.2' The Council of Europe prepared the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms,' 5 which specifically applied to European States.26
The nations of the Western Hemisphere, through the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS), 7 drafted the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights to promote and protect human rights in
the Americas.28
III. THE CONVENTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
The American Convention is modeled on the United Nations
human rights instruments 9 and the European Convention. The
24. The African equivalent, the Banjul Charter on Human and People's Rights,
infra note 163, was not presented until 1982. The text of this treaty is reprinted at
21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
25. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, Europ. T.S. No. 5, [hereinafter the European Con-
vention] reprinted in IAN BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 326
(1992). See generally J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1993); Rosalyn Higgins, The European
Convention on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND
POLICY IssUEs 495 (Theodore Meron ed., 1985).
26. As of December, 1994, thirty states had ratified this treaty, including: Aus-
tria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germa-
ny, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, The
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom. Council of Europe, Infor-
mation Sheet No. 35, July-Dec. 1994, Human Rights, HJINF (95)2, Strasbourg (1995).
Andorra, Estonia, and Lithuania have signed but have not yet ratified the European
Convention. Id.
In general, the member states of the European human rights system are
democratic, stable, and governed by the rule of law. See generally JOHN HENRY
MERRYMAN & DAVID S. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAw: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS (1978). Moreover, they are economically developed and
socially advanced, with high literacy rates, broad access to the media, and a safety
net of social programs. See Burns H. Weston et al., Regional Human Rights Re-
gimes: A Comparison and Appraisal, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585, 616 (1987).
27. The Organization of American States (OAS) is composed of all the nations
in the Western Hemisphere. The Cuban government was suspended from participa-
tion in the OAS in 1962 for adopting a Marxist-Leninist form of government. CART-
ER & TRIMBLE, supra note 19, at 236.
28. American Convention, supra note 11. For a discussion of the evolution of
the inter-American system, see THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., PROTECTING HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: SELECTED PROBLEMS (1990).
29. See generally Rodolfo Piza, Coordination of the Mechanisms for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights in the American Convention with Those Established by the
United Nations, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 167 (1980).
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drafters of the American Convention were not content, however,
to merely replicate these treaties. They were aware of the hu-
man rights abuses and other realities of the developing re-
gion," and made adaptations intended to enhance the protec-
tion of human rights within the unique circumstances of the
Western Hemisphere." One European observer to the drafting
conferences noted that, in several instances, delegates suggested
that the drafters more closely follow the wording of the United
Nations covenants.3 2 The majority of delegates, however, coun-
tered this suggestion, arguing that if the American states were
to conclude their own convention after the United Nations Cove-
nants were completed, "then it was appropriate to introduce any
modifications that were desirable in the light of circumstances
prevailing in the American Republics."3
A. Overview of the Inter-American System
The inter-American system of human rights is based on a
regional treaty, the American Convention on Human Rights.'
This treaty protects twenty-six substantive rights, including,
inter alia, the rights to life," humane treatment,36 personal
30. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (arts. 27(2), 25(1), and 7(6)), Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights, 8 Inter-Am. C.H.R., Advisory Opinion, Ser. A, 9
36 (1987).
31. Thomas Buergenthal & Robert Norris, 2 Hum. Rts., The Inter-American
System, Part 2, The Legislative History of the American Convention on Human
Rights, Chap. III, Reports on the Conference, at 88. While the American Convention
was still in the stage of proposals and drafts, the U.N. General Assembly in Decem-
ber, 1966, approved the text of the U.N. Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. At that time, the Member States of the OAS,
after being polled by the Council of the OAS, determined that they wished to go
ahead with a separate inter-American human rights treaty. Id.; see generally Weston
et al., supra note 26.
32. Council of Europe, Report on The Inter-American Specialized Conference on
Human Rights, supra note 31, at 71.
33. Id.
34. Twenty-five American nations have ratified the American Convention and
have thereby obligated themselves to respect the human rights contained therein.
The twenty-five nations include: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Hon-
duras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Dominican Repub-
lic, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The United States has
signed but never ratified the American Convention. Annual Report of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights 115-16 (1994).
35. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 4.
36. Id. art. 5.
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liberty, 7 a fair trial," privacy," and freedom of thought, ex-
pression," and religion." The American Convention establish-
es a two-tiered system to enforce human rights: the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights" and the Inter-Ameri-
can Court of Human Rights." All complaints by individuals
alleging human rights abuses must first be directed to the Inter-
American Commission, which is composed of seven commission-
ers." The Commission then determines whether the complaint
meets the statutory requisites of admissibility.' If it does not,
the Commission may ask the petitioner to complete the peti-
tion." If the complaint is prima facie admissible, the Commis-
sion informs the government involved of the relevant portions of
the complaint and requests that it provide pertinent informa-
tion. 7 Portions of the government's information are then sent
to the petitioner, along with a request for additional observa-
tions and evidence.4" If the government does not respond, as is
frequently the case, the Commission may treat the petition's
allegations as presumptively true.4" When appropriate, the
Commission attempts to bring about a friendly settlement. ° If,
37. Id. art. 7.
38. Id. art. 8.
39. Id. art. 11.
40. Id. art. 13.
41. Id. art. 12.
42. Id. art. 37.
43. Id. art. 33. See Carlos Alberto Dunshee de Abranches, The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, 30 Am. U. L. REv. 79, 80-5 (1980) (providing a brief back-
ground on the Court within the framework of the American Convention and the
Charter of the OAS).
44. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 36. The commissioners are chosen
from the Member States of the OAS and must be of recognized competence in the
field of human rights. No two Commission members may be nationals of the same
state. Id. art. 37.
45. Id. art. 48(l)(a).
46. Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human rights, art. 30(2),
modified June 29, 1987, reprinted in BASIc DOCUMENTS, supra note 11, at 115 [here-
inafter Regulations of the Commission].
47. Id. Unless the petitioner expressly authorizes disclosure, the Commission
withholds the identity of the petitioner from the government. Regulations of the
Commission. Id. art. 34(4).
46. Id. art. 34(7).
49. Id. art. 42.
50. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 48(1)(f). See Charles Moyer,
Friendly Settlement in the Inter-American System: The Verbitsky Case - When Push
Needn't Come to Shove, in LA CORTE Y EL SISTEMA INTER-AMERICANOS DE DERECHOS
HUMANOS 347 (1994) (analyzing a case in which the Commission successfully used
its good offices to bring about a friendly settlement).
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however, no friendly settlement is reached, the Commission
draws up a report and transmits it to the state concerned.51
Only after procedures before the Commission have been
exhausted can the case be referred to the Court, and then only if
the state involved has expressly recognized the Court's jurisdic-
tion.52 To date, seventeen state parties to the American Con-
vention have expressly accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.5"
1. Critique of the Effectiveness of a Two-Tiered System
It is questionable whether a two-tiered system, in which
cases must be considered first by a commission and then by a
court, is the most effective form of organization for the protec-
tion of human rights. The procedures before both bodies are
often time-consuming, and thus may not adequately protect the
victim's rights. For instance, in Veldsquez Rodriguez,' a Hon-
duran student was publicly detained by members of the Hondu-
ran security forces and subsequently disappeared. The period of
time between his family's first official petition to the Commis-
sion and the Commission's referral to the Court was approxi-
mately four and a half years.55 Four more years elapsed before
51. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 50(1).
52. Id. art. 51(1), 62(1). This declaration of jurisdiction "may be made uncon-
ditionally, on the condition of reciprocity, for a specified time, or for specific cases."
Id. art. 62(2). For a discussion of state acceptance of the Court's contentious jurisdic-
tion, see Dunshee de Abranches, supra note 43, at 104-05. See generally Hector Gros
Espiell, El Procedimiento Contencioso Ante La Corte Interamericana de Derechos
Humanos, in EsTuDIos SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS II 145 (1988).
53. The following states have accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American
Court: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Toba-
go, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See Annual Report of the Inter-American Court (1994),
supra note 34, at 115-16. El Salvador, the most recent state to accept the Court's
jurisdiction did so formally in June, 1995 at the General Assembly of the OAS.
54. Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, (Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 4, 35-
37 (1988).
55. Id. The facts of Veldsquez Rodriguez provide an example of delays and
continuations. Manfredo VelAsquez was disappeared in downtown Tegucigalpa, Hon-
duras by government agents on September 12, 1981, in front of eyewitnesses. On
October 7, 1981, relatives filed a human rights petition with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. The Commission communicated the relevant parts of
the petition to the Government for a response and then tried on several occasions to
obtain information, but the Government did not reply. On October 4, 1983, (two
years after the petition was originally filed) having received no response from Hon-
duras, the Commission applied its regulations and presumed as true the allegations
contained in the petition. Only at that point did Honduras reply, requesting recon-
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the Court issued its ultimate judgment."
Significant delay may result in a denial of justice to a victim
whose rights have been abused.57 Governments accused of hu-
man rights violations in the inter-American system are given
ample time to respond to complaints filed against them.58 Even
when a government has repeatedly failed to acknowledge re-
quests for information, the Commission must still allow the
statutorily allotted time period for the government's response.
Judge Piza Escalante, in an explanation of his dissenting vote in
In The Matter of Viviana Gallardo, questioned the need for pro-
cedures before the Commission:
[I] have come to the conclusion that unfortunately the system
of the Convention appears to make [the best protection of
human rights] impossible because the American States in
drafting it did not wish to accept the establishment of a swift
sideration of the Commission's determination on various grounds. On May 30, 1984,
the Commission agreed to reconsider its resolution and again requested information
from Honduras. Honduras did not respond. On Jan. 29, 1985, the Commission in-
formed Honduras that it would render a final decision in March, 1985. On March 1,
Honduras again requested an extension on the grounds that it had set up an inves-
tigatory commission. The Commission granted an additional thirty day extension. On
October 17, 1985, Honduras gave the Commission a report of its investigation, in
which charges against all officials were dismissed except for the charge against a
former general who was in exile and was out of favor with the Government. Finally,
on April 18, 1986 (four and a half years after the petition was filed), the Commis-
sion referred the case to the Court. Id. 1 1-10.
56. On July 29, 1988, the Court pronounced judgment on the merits of the
case. VelAsquez Rodriguez Case, (Merits). On July 21, 1989, the Court issued a judg-
ment on compensatory damages. Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, (Compensatory Damag-
es), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 7 (1988). The Court then issued an Interpretation
of the Compensatory Damages Judgment on August 17, 1990. Velfisquez Rodriguez
Case, (Interpretation), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C., No. 9 (1990).
57. See SCOTT DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 203
(1992).
An advisory opinion by the Court on whether the repeated extensions granted
by the Commission to the governments. during the procedural stage violate the
petitioner's right to prompt and effective justice could prove valuable to the function-
ing of the system. The Court can use its advisory jurisdiction, which is broader than
that of any international tribunal, "to give judicial expression to certain principles
that are basic to the development of the international law of human rights." Thomas
Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, 79
AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 25 (1985).
58. The Commission allows a government ninety days to respond to a petition.
Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 46, art.
34(5) reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 11, at 103, 115. The government
may then request extensions which may total no more than 180 days. Id. art. 34
(6).
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and effective jurisdictional system but rather they hobbled it
by interposing the impediment of the Commission, by estab-
lishing a veritable obstacle course that is almost insurmount-
able, on the long and arduous road that the basic rights of
the individual are forced to travel.69
The Inter-American Court had the opportunity in In The
Matter of Viviana Gallardo to curtail recourse to the Commis-
sion under certain circumstances. It chose, however, not to expe-
dite access to the Court." In this case, a Costa Rican prisoner
was shot and killed in her prison cell by an off-duty member of
the Costa Rican civil guard. The Costa Rican government sought
to waive all procedures before the Commission and take the case
directly to the Court.6 ' The Court refused Costa Rica's re-
quest,"2 reasoning that direct access might damage the integri-
ty of the system and would not allow the victim the opportunity
to pursue a friendly settlement.' The Court could have allowed
direct access by a state party with the consent of the victim."
In such a case, the victim's rights would have been protected.
Furthermore, as both the victim and the state would have
agreed to waive the Commission's procedures, the integrity of
the system would also have been maintained.
The two-tiered inter-American system was modeled on the
European human rights system, which is currently undergoing
complete reform. Under the reform, the European Commission
will be eliminated and its functions will be handled by a perma-
nent court.6 One reason for the change is the length of time re-
quired for decisions; in 1993 the average time was five years and
eight months. On average, a case was before the European Com-
mission for four years and three months, and in the European
59. In The Matter of Viviana Gallardo et al., Inter-Am. C.H.R., Advisory Opin-




63. Id. 24, 25.
64. See DAVIDSON, supra note 57, at 200-01. A problem with this analysis,
however, is that the victim is not a party to the case. Normally, only parties to a
case can waive procedures.
65. See Andrew Drzemczewski & Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Principal Characteristics
of the New ECHR Control Mechanism, as Established by Protocol No. 11, Signed on
11 May 1994, 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 81, 84 (1994).
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Court for one year and three months.6" The reform followed a
determination that delays put the system in danger of overload
and consequent non-compliance with the fundamental guarantee
that proceedings be conducted within a reasonable time. 7
The inter-American system is not prepared for many of the
reforms currently under way in the European system, mainly
because American states are not yet fully participating in or
supportive of the inter-American human rights system. Protocol
11 to the European Convention institutes the reform of the sys-
tem. As of May 11, 1994, when Protocol 11 was opened for sig-
nature, all states parties had accepted the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the European Court.8 Conversely, the states parties to
the American Convention have not shown a comparable endorse-
ment of the Inter-American Court; only seventeen of twenty-five
have accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.69 Conse-
quently, any attempt to increase the role of the Court at this
time might have a negative impact on the inter-American
system's stability.
Furthermore, the inter-American system does not face all of
the same pressures as the European system. The contracting
states to the European Convention have increased from twenty-
three in 1990 to thirty as of December, 1994.7o Moreover, many
Central and Eastern European countries now participate in the
system, and this has increased the number and complexity of
cases being brought.7 In the inter-American system, only twen-
ty-five of the thirty-five OAS member states have ratified the
American Convention, and the number of complaints to the
66. Id. at 85.
67. Rolv Ryssdal, The Reform of the Control Machinery of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, in LA CORTE Y EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANOS DE DERECHOS
HUMANOS 481, 484 (1994).
68. See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Additional Protocols, 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 114 (1994). Twenty-seven
of the twenty-eight states parties to the European Convention at that time signed
the Protocol. Only Italy did not.sign. Id. at 81, n.j.
69. For those state parties that have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Inter-American Court see supra note 53.
70. Council of Europe, Information Sheet No. 35, supra note 26.
71. Drzemczewski & Meyer-Ladewig, supra note 65, at 81, 84 (also stating that
a lesser pressure has been "the movement of the European Community (Union) to-
wards a single market and political union with increased awareness of the legal and
political importance of human rights protection as a component part of the European
Union's concerns.").
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Commission would be manageable with additional staff lawyers
and longer sessions.72 Although the inter-American system may
ultimately require similar reforms, the time has not come for
such extensive changes.
Still, the inter-American system must minimize the time
required to resolve a case. Lengthy preliminary procedures do
not meet the needs of a victim who may be facing torture or
death, or of the family that seeks a remedy for its loss. 3 As
explained by a former member of the Inter-American Commis-
sion, "[1]ong before all of these procedures have been completed,
however, the patience of the complainant, although not his inju-
ry, may have come to an end, and in many cases it may be the
end of the endurance or the life of the person tortured." More-
over, procedural delays are especially unacceptable when a gov-
ernment chooses to continue its course of conduct and thus is
interested in delaying and manipulating the system.75
2. Provisional Measures at the Request of the Commission to
Lessen Delay
A provision of the American Convention, unique to the in-
ter-American System, allows the Commission in "cases of ex-
treme gravity and urgency" to circumvent its time-consuming
procedures and immediately request adoption of provisional
measures by the Court.7" In adopting such measures, as in
granting an interim injunction, the Court may order the state to
take or refrain from taking certain actions. For instance, the
Court may order a state to refrain from executing a prisoner or
72. For a list of states parties to the American Convention see supra note 34.
The U.S. has not ratified the Convention.
73. See infra part III.A.2.
74. Volio, supra note 6, at 76-7 (requesting amendments to expedite procedures
before the Inter-American Commission).
75. CECILIA MEDINA QUIROGA, THE BATTLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: GROSS SYSTEM-
ATIC VIOLATIONS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 2 (1988) [hereinafter MEDINA
QUIROGA].
76. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 63(2). Article 63(2) provides that:
In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid
irreparable damage to persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional
measures as it deems pertinent in matters it has under consideration.
With respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court, it may act at the
request of the Commission.
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to provide protection to certain individuals.
Most judicial systems permit a court to order provisional
measures when the case is before the court. The inter-American
system, however, is the only one to statutorily permit the Court
to order such measures even before it is seized of the case. An
example of the successful use of provisional measures occurred
in Chunima.7v In this case, several members of a local Indian
group monitoring human rights abuses in the Guatemalan high-
lands78 were killed.79 Although local civil defense patrol lead-
ers"o had threatened the victims and then bragged about com-
mitting the murders, the army refused assistance and the police
were unable to act. Two Guatemalan judges issued arrest war-
rants for the civil patrol leaders; they received death threats and
were forced into hiding. The remaining group members and their
families also went into hiding. These precautions were ineffec-
tive, however, and another member was murdered.8'
Generally, the extensive procedures required under tradi-
tional human rights law do not allow for immediate assistance
to those in imminent danger. However, the inter-American sys-
tem responded quickly in Chunima. The Commission immediate-
ly requested the Court to order provisional measures. The Court
then ordered the Guatemalan government to protect the threat-
ened persons.82 These measures were apparently successful as
no additional members of the group were killed.
Provisional measures have a potentially significant role in
the Americas and other developing regions due to the urgent
character of many local human rights abuses.8' The potential
77. See Chunima Case, (Provisional Measures), Aug. 1, 1991 Order of the Inter-
Am. C.H.R., reprinted in 1991 INTER-AM. Y.B. HuM. RTS. 1118.
78. In 1988, hundreds of villagers from the Quiche province founded the Coun-
cil of Ethnic Communities Renujel Juman (CERJ). CERJ was the first organization
established to defend the rights of Guatemala's Maya population and to increase the
community's awareness of the rights bestowed upon them by the Guatemalan Con-
stitution. 1990 INTER-AM. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 246.
79. Chunima Case, (Provisional Measures).
80. The Civil Patrols were established by the Guatemalan government in 1982,
ostensibly to protect villages from guerrillas, and "are military structures established
by the military." 1990 INTER-AM. Y.B. HuM. RTs. 242.
81. Chunima Case, (Emergency Provisional Measures), July 15, 1991 Order of
the Pres. Inter-Am. C.H.R., reprinted in 1991 INTER-AM. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 1104, 1106-
1112, $ 4.
82. Chunima Case, (Provisional Measures), at 1126, 1128 res. 1.
83. See Thomas Buergenthal, Interim Measures in the Inter.American Court of
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for irreparable damage often requires an immediacy of response
which can only be provided by provisional measures." This pre-
ventive function - where the lives and physical security of per-
sons are concerned - is far more valuable than the compensa-
tory function of a final judgment."5
B. Access to the System
An international human rights system can only be effective
if individual victims have both de jure and de facto access to its
remedies. Broadened individual access to international protec-
tion of human rights, especially for the poor, illiterate, and in-
timidated is essential.
1. Direct Individual Access
Traditionally, only states have had automatic standing to
file petitions or complaints against other states in international
law." Individuals have never had such standing. This is true
Human Rights, in INTERIM MEASURES INDICATED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS 84-89
(R. Bernhardt ed., 1994); Jo Pasqualucci, Provisional Measures in the Inter-American
Human Rights System, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 803, 820-21 (1993) (also dis-
cussing provisional measures in the ICJ and European Systems). In Spanish, see Jo
Pasqualucci, Medidas Provisionales en la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos:
Una Comparacidn con La Corte Internacional de Justicia y la Corte Europea de
Derechos Humanos, 19 REV. I.I.D.H. 47 [INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS] (1994); Josd Miguel Vivanco & Juan E. Mendez, Medidas de Proteccidn para
Testigos en Casos ante La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 19 REV.
I.I.D.H. 157 (1994).
84. See Dunshee de Abranches, supra note 43, at 79, 109.
85. In addition to Chunima, provisional measures have been ordered by the
Inter-American Court in the Bustios-Rojas Case (Peru), Decision of August 8, 1990,
Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1991) [hereinafter
Bustios-Rojas Case]; Colotenengo Case, Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights 73 (1994); Velaisquez Rodriguez Case, (Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser.
C, No. 4, 91 43-5 (1988). In the combined Honduran Cases, including Veldsquez
Rodriguez, provisional measures were ordered while the cases were before the Court.
Provisional measures were also ordered in the Caballero Delgado and Santana Case
when the case was before the Court. Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Annual
Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 83, 85 (1994). The Court de-
nied the Commission's request for provisional measures in the Peruvian Prisons
Case, Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 21-23 (1993), and
the Chipoco Case, Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 17-
19 (1993). The president of the Court ordered emergency provisional measures in the
Reggiardo-Tolosa Case, Annual Report of the Inter-American Court 95-98 (1993).
86. In the European system, a state party must make an express declaration to
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even in international human rights law, which was created to
protect individuals. An individual's only recourse when injured
by the action of a state was to convince his or her own govern-
ment to file a complaint;87 if that government was the violator,
there was almost no recourse under international law. Through-
out history, when human rights abuses became endemic to a
state only rarely did other states complain,8 and such action
was often politically motivated. Political reality seems to inspire
a certain hesitancy among states. Even when concerned about
human rights violations in another state, a state will often be
reluctant to make accusations for fear of jeopardizing its eco-
nomic interests or of having its own practices condemned.89
The American Convention is the first human rights treaty
under which state parties automatically agree to the right of
individual petition." This provision affords individuals access
to the mechanisms designed for their protection. In a reversal of
customary procedure, upon ratifying the American Convention a
state must make an express declaration which allows for inter-
state complaints.91 Such inter-state complaints are not as es-
sential as individual access to the adequate functioning of any
human rights system.
2. The Right of a Non-Governmental Organization to File on
Behalf of the Victim
Even the direct authority to file complaints of human rights
abuse will not always allow individuals to avail themselves of
international human rights protection. Poverty, lack of educa-
tion, and a scarcity of legal assistance all limit access to interna-
tional assistance.92 Many victims of human rights violations are
recognize the competence of the Commission to receive petitions from individuals.
European Convention, supra note 25, art. 25.
87. See BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 518-519.
88. The Greek Case, 1969 EuR. Y.B. 501 (Council of Europe).
89. See David Weissbrodt & Maria Luisa Bartolomei, The Effectiveness of Inter-
national Human Rights Pressures: The Case of Argentina, 1976-1983, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 1009, 1030 (1991).
90. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 44.
91. Id. art. 45.
92. See Weston et al., supra note 26, at 617-18 (arguing that repressive socio-
economic and political conditions, low levels of literacy, unavailability of the media,
and arbitrary denial of the protection of law inhibit individual access to the human
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rural peasants with a limited education who are simply too poor
to hire a lawyer. 3 Additionally, in many states victims and
their families are intimidated and fear retaliation if they com-
plain of human rights violations. Complainants and their law-
yers sometimes become the next victims.94 Consequently, even
those relatives of victims willing to take the risk can seldom find
a lawyer willing to take their case.9"
The American Convention is the only human rights treaty
that attempts to counteract such problems of access or intimida-
tion by allowing unrelated parties to complain of human rights
violations on behalf of the victim. Any state party to the Con-
vention automatically agrees to the right of individual petition,
not only by the victim or relative of the victim, but also by "any
nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more mem-
ber states" of the OAS.97 Thus, the petitioner may be an inter-
national non-governmental organization (NGO), such as Amnes-
ty International or America's Watch," which has more exten-
rights system).
93. See Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies in Cases of Indi-
gence or Inability to Obtain Legal Representation Because of a Generalized Fear
Within the Legal Community, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Advisory Opinion of Aug. 10, 1990,
Ser. A, OC-11190, reprinted in 12 HuM. RTS. L.J. 20 (1991) thereinafter Exceptions to
the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies, Advisory Opinion].
94. Id. $ 3.
95. Id.
96. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 44. Even those international trea-
ties which allow a state to make an express grant of standing to individuals limit
that standing to the victim. The European Convention, supra note 25, article 25
requires that a state party must make an express declaration to recognize the com-
petence of the Commission to receive petitions from individuals. The declaration
allows a petition to be made by any person, non-governmental organization (NGO),
or group of individuals claiming to be the victim. Id.; see Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 1-2, reprinted in HUMAN
RIGHTS, A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 38, 39, (U.N. 1988). See
Gates Garrity-Rokous & Raymond H. Brescia, Procedural Justice and International
Human Rights: Towards a Procedural Jurisprudence for Human Rights Tribunals, 18
YALE J. INTL L. 559 (1993).
97. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 44. A member state is any state
belonging to the OAS even though that state has not necessarily ratified the Ameri-
can Convention or accepted the jurisprudence of the Court. Id. Consequently, organi-
zations such as Amnesty International, which are legally recognized in the U.S. and
Canada, have standing to file complaints on behalf of victims in any state which has
ratified the American Convention.
98. See generally David Padilla, The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights of the Organization of American States: A Case Study, 9 AM. U. J. INT. L.
POL 95, 97-115 (1993) [hereinafter Padilla, A Case Study] (listing the several NGOs
which represent victims or their families and providing examples of the functions
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sive resources than individuals and fewer security problems
related to investigating and filing complaints. 9 For example,
when a Peruvian journalist was allegedly murdered by the mili-
tary, and witnesses and some members of the victim's family
were killed or threatened, this provision of the Convention al-
lowed the World Council of Journalists to intercede and file a
complaint with the Commission." The Council of Journalists,
a worldwide organization, was less responsive to intimidation,
and the publicity the Council generated provided some protec-
tion to the domestic witnesses.
3. No Individual Standing Before the Court
The American Convention stopped short of giving individu-
als standing to bring a case before the Inter-American Court."'
Only the states parties to the case and the Commission have
such standing."m Therefore, an individual petitioner has no re-
course if unsatisfied with the Commission's decision or if the
government fails to comply with its recommendations.l°"
The right of an individual to bring a case before a human
rights court is a logical step in the development of human rights
law. "The situation whereby the individual is granted rights but
not given the possibility to exploit fully the control machinery
provided for enforcing them, could today be regarded as inconsis-
tent with the spirit of the Convention, not to mention compati-
bility with domestic-law procedures in states parties."1°4 An
performed by these NGOs before the Commission).
99. Id. at 100 (stating that "[flor obvious reasons of timing, access, and resourc-
es," these parties can perform "key functions of investigating allegations of human
rights violations").
100. Bustios-Rojas Case, (Provisional Measures), Order of the Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
1, reprinted in Annual Report of the Inter-Am. C.H.R. (1990).
101. Individuals are not permitted to initiate proceedings before the International
Court of Justice. The Statute of the Court provides that "[o]nly States may be par-
ties in cases before the Court." Statute of the International Court of Justice, June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, art. 34(1) reprinted in CARTER & TRIMBLE su-
pra note 19, at 30, 36.
102. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 61. The state party must have
recognized the jurisdiction of the Court either in general or by special agreement for
a particular case. Id. art. 62.
103. See Manuel D. Vargas, Individual Access to the Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 601, 616 (1984) (discussing the means by
which an individual might convince a relevant party to gain access to the Court).
104. PROTOCOL No. 9 TO THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HuMAN
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institution like the Commission, in deciding whether to refer a
case to the Court, may consider other interests such as the re-
sources required and the possible impact of the case on the sys-
tem. 5 From the perspective of the victim or the victim's fami-
ly, however, these considerations should not interfere with the
enforcement of rights. Consequently, the complainant should
have the option to petition the Court directly for further consid-
eration of the case. 1' 6
Another advantage of individual standing may be a
depoliticization of the Commission's role. Currently, the Com-
mission fulfills several roles, not all of them complementary.
When processing an individual petition, the Commission serves
as a factual investigator, a mediator in efforts at friendly settle-
ments, and, if the case is not favorably resolved, as prosecu-
tor.1"7 The role of prosecutor in one case may jeopardize its role
as mediator in another case involving the same state. If relieved
of the prosecutorial role, the Commission's capacity for encour-
aging states to protect human rights and its function in facilitat-
ing friendly settlements might be enhanced.
Furthermore, due to its limited financial and personnel
resources, the Commission must rely extensively on NGOs to
fulfill both its investigative and prosecutorial functions. 8
These same NGOs have for many years publicly pressured
states to improve their human rights records. As a result, they
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, EXPLANATORY REPORT, reprinted in 12 HuM.
RTS. L.J. 51, 52 (1991) [hereinafter Protocol 9].
105. Claudio Grossman, Disappearances in Honduras: The Need for Direct Victim
Representation in Human Rights Litigation, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 363
(1992).
If individual appeals were permitted, the Court might accept a case even
when the Commission had not favored referral. This could necessitate elimination of
the requirement that the Commission be a party to any case before the Court. The
Commission could have an advisory role. American Convention, supra note 11, art.
57; Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, art. 28 (1979), reprinted
in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 11, at 133, 142.
106. Patrick Robinson, The Inter-American Human Rights System, 17 WEST INDI-
AN L. J. 8, 24 (1992).
107. In the Matter of Viviana Gallardo, Decision of November 13, 1981, Inter-
Am. C.H.R., No. G 101/81, 22, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1424, 1428 (1981); see also
Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International
Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT. L. 611, 615 (1994) (the Commission's role of
Ministerio Pdblico, referred to in In the Matter of Viviana Gallardo, is the same as
that of the public prosecutor in North America).
108. See Padilla, A Case Study, supra note 98, at 101.
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are often perceived by governments as enemies of the state. The
close working relationship between the Commission and these
NGOs has resulted in allegations by some states that the Com-
mission does not maintain even a modicum of impartiality. If
the Commission were to diminish its prosecutorial role, it could
rely less on NGO assistance. The NGOs would remain actively
involved, but states would view them as lending assistance to
the victims rather than to the Commission. This would be more
in keeping with the functioning of an impartial system.
Granting all individuals immediate standing would open the
Court's flood gates. It would, therefore, be administratively im-
possible under the current inter-American system in which the
Court sits only part-time. An intermediary step recently incorpo-
rated into the European system,"° however, would allow those
petitioners who have completed proceedings before the Commis-
sion to appeal to the Court. For example, these petitioners might
appeal if they are dissatisfied with the Commission's result, or if
the government fails to comply with its recommendations. The
Court could then exercise discretion in determining whether to
consider the case, in much the same way as the European Court
of Human Rights" ' and the U.S. Supreme Court would do. If
the case raises a serious question concerning the interpretation
or application of the American Convention, a panel of judges
could determine whether the case should be heard by the plena-
ry Court.
109. Protocol 9 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms permits the party which has lodged the complaint with
the Commission to later refer the case to the Court. Article 3 of Protocol 9, which
changes article 44 of the Convention, states:
Article 44 of the Convention shall read as follows:
Only the High Contracting Parties, the Commission, and persons, non-
governmental organizations or groups of individuals having submitted a
petition under Article 25 shall have the right to bring a case before the
Court.
Supra note 104, at 51. Protocol 9 entered into force on October 1, 1994, and as of
Dec. 31, 1994, it had been ratified by fifteen of the thirty contracting states to the
European Convention. Council of Europe, Information Sheet No. 35, supra note 26,
at 1.
110. Under Protocol 9 of the European system, when the case is referred to the
Court by the victim rather than by the state party or the Commission, it must first
be submitted to a panel of three judges. The panel determines whether the case
raises "a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Conven-
tion" or whether for any other reason it warrants consideration by the Court. Proto-
col 9, supra note 104, art. 5.
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A preliminary panel of judges, or even a plenary Court mak-
ing this initial decision, could present a difficulty which is not
present in the European system. In both the inter-American and
European systems, the named state party has the right to nomi-
nate a judge to the panel deciding the case."' In the European
system, where the number of judges is equal to the number of
members of the Council of Europe," 2 each state has already
nominated a judge on the European Court. That judge sits ex
officio as a member of any panel making a decision regarding
that state party, including future decisions as to whether the
European Court will consider a case."' However, the Inter-
American Court is composed of only seven judges."' Therefore,
it is often necessary for the state party in a case submitted to
the Court to name an ad hoc judge to sit."' It is likely that
states would demand to have an ad hoc judge on any panel mak-
ing the initial decision of whether the Court will consider a case
against a state party referred to the Court by the victim or rep-
resentative of the victim. If petitioners referred to the Court
even a fraction of the matters decided by the Commission, the
initial determination of whether a case should even be heard by
the Court would prove expensive and time-consuming for an
institution with already limited resources."1 6
Despite the many positive considerations, the inter-Ameri-
can system is not yet prepared for seizure of the Court by indi-
vidual petitioners. Although granting individual standing before
the Court is less drastic than eliminating the two-tiered system,
even this level of change might have a negative effect on its
overall stability and growth."7 The European system did not
111. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 55. European Convention, supra
note 25, art. 43. All decisions of the Inter-American Court are decided in plenary
session with five judges constituting a quorum. American Convention, supra note 11,
art. 56. European Court decisions are made normally in Chambers rather than by
the plenary court. European Convention, supra note 25, art. 43.
112. European Convention, supra note 25, art. 38.
113. Protocol 9, supra note 104, art. 5
114. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 52.
115. Id. art. 55.
116. See infra part VIA
117. Padilla, A Case Study, supra note 98, at 110. David Padilla, former Deputy
Secretary of the Inter-American Commission, states:
I believe it would be imprudent if not downright risky to accelerate and
expand the role of the private actor in the conduct of contentious cases
before the Inter-American Court until and unless a substantial majority
of the OAS member states are likely to acquiesce to such changes. Rejec-
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attempt to incorporate this change until all members of the
Council of Europe had ratified the European Convention and
accepted the jurisdiction of the European Court. A change of
such magnitude would require a Protocol to the American Con-
vention, and such a Protocol is not likely to be accepted by the
American states until there is greater consensus on the system.
4. No Right of Victim to Direct Legal Representation Before
the Court
Not only does the individual lack standing, but even when
the Commission refers a case to the Court the individual victim
or complainant lacks any statutory right to direct legal repre-
sentation before the Court. Initially, the complainant has the
right to name an attorney for procedures before the Commis-
sion."1 This right, however, does not extend to participation
before the Court. Under the terms of the American Convention,
the Commission and the state are the only lawful parties, and it
is the Commission's role to represent the victim before the
Court."' On the other hand, the Court permits the Commis-
sion to name the victims' attorneys as assistants to the Commis-
sion delegates in Court proceedings. 2 ' The Court acknowl-
edged these assistants for the first time in the Honduran cas-
es. "'21 The Court even allowed the victims' lawyers to present
tion of these developments could jeopardize broader acceptance by reticent
member states of the OAS whose participation in the system is essential
for future progress.
118. Regulations of the Commission, supra note 46, art. 27, at 103, 112.
119. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 61. The role of the European
Commission differs from the role of the Inter-American Commission. The European
Commission's role before the Court is that of "defender of the public interest." In
that role, the Commission must be objective and impartial. Although the Commission
may express an opinion, it may not act as an advocate for the complainant. J.G.
MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 45 (1993).
120. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, art. 22,
adopted by the Court at its twenty-third session held January 9-18, 1991, reprinted
in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 11, at 145, 153. The Commission may name the
attorneys of the original claimant or of the victim or the victim's next of kin. Id.
art. 22(2).
121. Velfsquez Rodriguez Case, (Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 4 (1988);
Godinez-Cruz Case, (Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 5 (1989); Fairen Garbi
and Solis Corrales Case, (Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 6 (1989). The Hon-
duran cases all dealt with evidence relating to a governmental policy of disappear-
ances in Honduras during the same period. The Court heard evidence on this issue
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their views on compensation directly to the Court when those
views differed from those of the Commission.122 The decision to
name the victims' lawyers as assistants has become the
Commission's policy, but it is within the Commission's discretion
whether to maintain that policy.12 Thus, if differences arise
between the Commission and the victims' attorneys, the Com-
mission could reject their participation. This should be the deci-
sion of the victims rather than that of the Commission.
The European human rights system originally limited the
role of the petitioner's legal counsel to that of assistants to the
Commission. 24 In 1982, however, the European Court amend-
ed its rules to permit direct victim representation.2 ' The inter-
American practice, which was modeled on the European system,
may also be outmoded and should be reconsidered. A member of
the Inter-American Commission, Claudio Grossman, argues that
direct legal representation can be effectuated in either of two
ways."6 First, the current Rules of Procedure of the Inter-
American Court could be interpreted to allow for direct victim
representation, 2 7 or second, the Court could modify its Rules
to allow for direct representation, as was done by the European
Court.'28 Arguably, even such a limited step might jeopardize
future state acceptance in the inter-American system.'29 The
system, however, must continue to evolve if it is to adequately
in all three cases simultaneously.
122. Grossman, supra note 105, at 371.
123. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, art. 22,
supra note 120, at 145, 153.
124. See Juan Mendez, La Participaci6n de la Vfctima Ante La Corte
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, in LA CORTE Y EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANOS
DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, at 321, 323-24 (1994) (providing a brief history of the de-
velopment of individual participation in the European system).
125. Revised Rules of the European Court of Human Rights, 1982 Y.B. EUR.
CONW. ON H.R. 5, 14, Rule 30(1) (effective Jan. 1, 1983).
The inter-American system does not provide the complainants with free legal
aid if they are indigent, and for that same reason they cannot pursue their cases.
Under the European system, this assistance pays the fees for legal counsel as well
as travel, hotel, and other necessary expenses for the applicant and attorney for
appearances before the Commission and the Court. See P. VAN DIJK & G.J.M. VAN
HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 55-
56 (1984) (citing Addendum to the Rules, Council of Europe, Collected Texts, 315-316
(1979)).
126. Grossman, supra note 105, at 384-388.
127. Id. at 384-88.
128. Id. at 388.
129. See Padilla, A Case Study, supra note 98.
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protect human rights. The transitional step from the victims'
lawyers appearing as the Commissioner's assistants to their
direct appearance on behalf of the victims may be the next step
which should be taken in the strengthening of victims' rights.
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS PRECEDENTS ESTABLISHED BY THE INTER-
AMERICAN COURT
The Convention-based developments in human rights law
are supplemented by the substantive and procedural precedents
set by the Inter-American Court. The Court's determinations
have advanced the international law of human rights, at times
by validating innovative approaches established by the Inter-
American Commission.
Many of the Court's precedents relate to gross and system-
atic abuses of human rights, a problem which has plagued some
Latin American states. During times of social unrest, govern-
ments may intentionally and systematically perpetrate gross
human rights abuses, mainly against particular segments of
society, in order to bully the population into fear and submis-
sion.'o To combat perceived subversion,131  many regimes
simply avoid state judicial systems and resort to kidnapping,
torture, extra-judicial executions and disappearances. 32 Where
130. Gross and systematic violations of human rights are perpetrated pursuant
to government policy in such numbers and in such a manner that the rights to life,
personal integrity, and personal liberty of certain sectors of the population are
threatened. MEDINA QUIROGA, supra note 75, at 16, quoted in Cecilia Medina
Quiroga, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, 12 HuM. RTS. Q. 439, 440 n. 5 (1990).
131. Argentine Decree No. 158/83, which ordered that the members of the former
Military Junta be brought to justice, affirmed that: "Thousands of persons were
illegally deprived of their liberty, were tortured and murdered as a result of the
application of... the totalitarian Doctrine of National Security." quoted in
COMMISION NACIONAL SOBRE LA DESAPARICION DE PERSONAS, NUNCA MAS [National
Commission on the Disappearance of Persons, Never Again] 473 (1984) [hereinafter
NUNCA MAS]. For discussion of the national security doctrine in Latin America, see
LAWRENCE WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE, SETTLING ACCOUNTS WITH TORTUR-
ERS 119-20 (1990).
132. See J. Lauchlan Wash et al., Conference Report, The Inter-American Human
Rights System: Into the 1990's and Beyond, 3 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 517, 532
(1988) (citing Military Regimes in Latin America, 17 INT'L COMM'N JURISTS REV. 13,
13-16 (1976)); see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ARGENTINA: THE MILITARY JUNTA
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 10; U.N. TRUTH COMMISSION REPORT FOR EL SALVA-
DOR, supra note 8, and Chile, infra note 142.
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such a governmental policy becomes prevalent, the rule of law
dissolves, and national mechanisms for the protection of human
rights are ineffective. 3'
A governmental policy of gross and systematic human rights
abuses often includes forced disappearances. A forced disappear-
ance takes place when government agents or those working for
the government kidnap and hold a person incommunicado in a
clandestine prison. The kidnappers then subject the prisoner to
torture and other cruel and inhuman punishment, secretly exe-
cute him or her without trial, and then destroy or conceal the
body'"' "to eliminate any material evidence of the crime and to
ensure the impunity of those responsible."'35 The government
refuses to acknowledge that the person has been in custody, and
the victims' loved ones live in continual uncertainty, shifting
between hope and despair.' The Inter-American Court is the
first international court to confront this specific human rights
problem. In 1986, the Commission referred to the Court three
cases filed against Honduras: Veldsquez Rodriguez, Godinez
Cruz, and Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales. Each contained simi-
133. MEDINA QuiROGA, supra note 75, at 440.
The judiciary is often threatened and then becomes powerless to act in such
situations. In Chunima, indigenous human rights monitors were being murdered in
the highlands of Guatemala and the two judges who investigated the complaints and
issued arrest warrants received death threats and were forced into hiding. Chunima
Case, (Emergency Provisional Measures), July 15, 1991 Order of the Pres. Inter-Am.
C.H.R., reprinted in 1991 INTER-AM. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 1104, 1106-1112, 4.
134. In Argentina during the "dirty war," the armed forces reportedly eliminated
bodies by drugging victims and then dropping them alive from airplanes into the
ocean. NUNCA MAS, supra note 131, at 235-36; Calvin Sims, Argentine Tells of
Dumping "Dirty War" Captives Into Sea, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1995, at Al; Calvin
Sims, Argentina to Name More Missing in 'Dirty War", N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1995,
at 1.
135. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, (Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 4,
147-48 (1988).
136. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has stated that a mother
who lives in continuing uncertainty as to the fate of her disappeared daughter is
also a victim of the violation of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, particu-
larly article 7. Case No 107/1981 quoted in Study Concerning the Right to Restitu-
tion, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, final report submitted by Mr. Theo Van Boven,
Special rapporteur to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Pro-
tection of Minorities, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 45th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4,
at 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4fSub.211993 [hereinafter Van Boven Report]. Also, the Hon-
duran Human Rights Commissioner stated that the victims of disappearances were
not only those who were disappeared, but also the parents, spouses, children and
other relatives. THE FACTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES, supra note 8, at 19.
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lar allegations and were heard simultaneously by the Court.'37
All involved a victim or victims allegedly disappeared at the
hands of persons acting for the Honduran government. The
Court's rulings in these cases and in its advisory opinions on
related issues have resulted in significant advances in interna-
tional human rights law.
A. Substantive Precedents
The Inter-American Court has established important sub-
stantive precedents in the areas of gross and systematic human
rights violations, as well as in indigenous rights and victim
reparation.
1. Habeas Corpus as a Non-Derogable Right
The Court has ruled that the right to habeas corpus may
not be suspended even during a declared state of emergency.'38
The American Convention is the first international human
rights instrument to prohibit the suspension of certain "judicial
guarantees" even during a state of emergency." In serious
emergencies, most human rights treaties allow a state to tempo-
rarily derogate from certain human rights.4' Other rights,
however, such as the right to life and the right to humane.
treatment may never be suspended.14 Nevertheless, despite
137. See supra note 121.
138. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, supra note 30, 9 36; see generally
Elizabeth Faulkner, The Right to Habeas Corpus: Only in the Americas, 9 AM. U. J.
INT. L. & POLY 653 (1994) (describing the differences between state rights to dero-
gate in the American Convention and the European Convention).
139. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 27.
140. Id. 9 12. The American Convention provides: "[I]n times of war, public
danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State
Party," the state may take measures derogating from certain of the rights protected
by the Convention. Supra note 11, art. 27(1). The derogation may be only "to the
extent and for the period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situa-
tion . . . . " Id. For a more comprehensive discussion in Spanish of states of emer-
gency and human rights in Latin America, see DANIEL ZOVArO, Los ESTADOS DE
EXCEPCION Y LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS EN AMERICA LATINA (1990).
141. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 27(2). Other rights that may
never be derogated from under the American Convention include: the right to
juridical personality (art.3), freedom from slavery (art. 6), freedom from ex post facto
laws (art. 9), freedom of conscience and religion (art. 12), rights of the family (art.
17), right to a name (art. 18), rights of the child (art. 20), and the right to partici-
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this prohibition:
the realities that have been the experience of the peoples of
this hemisphere in recent decades, particularly disappearanc-
es, torture and murder committed or tolerated by some gov-
ernments... has demonstrated over and over again that the
rights to life and to humane treatment are threatened when-
ever the right to habeas corpus is partially or wholly sus-
pended.""
Judicial guarantees are indispensable to the maintenance of
the rule of law, and the writ of habeas corpus is perhaps the
most essential of all judicial guarantees.' The purpose of the
writ is to bring a detained person before a judge, who can then
verify that the prisoner is alive and that he or she has not been
tortured. "Habeas corpus performs a vital role in ensuring that a
person's life and physical integrity are respected, in preventing
his disappearance or the keeping of his whereabouts secret and
in protecting him against torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrad-
ing punishment or treatment."1 " Thus, the American
Convention's mandate that the judicial guarantees necessary to
protect non-derogable rights cannot be suspended even during a
state of emergency, and the Court's holding that habeas corpus
constitutes one of these non-derogable guarantees, are of prima-
ry importance in regions which suffer gross and systematic vio-
lations of human rights.
pate in government (art. 23). Id.
142. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, supra note 30, 36; see generally
NUNCA MAS, supra note 131; INFORME DE LA COMISIN NACIONAL DE VERDAD Y
REcONCILACI 6N, CHILE, [NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION RE-
PORT, CHILE], March, 1991; U.N. TRUTH COMMISSION REPORT FOR EL SALVADOR,
supra note 8; THE FACTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES, supra note 8.
Some States have even promulgated special laws or have instituted a
practice enabling them to hold a detainee incommunicado for a prolonged
period of time, in some cases for as long as fifteen days. During that
time, the detainee may be refused all contact with the outside world,
thus preventing resort to the writ of habeas corpus."
Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, supra note 30 (quoting the request of the
Inter-American Commission, January 30, 1987).
143. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, supra note 30; Judicial Guarantees
in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25, 8 American Convention on Human Rights),
Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of October 6, 1987.
144. Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, supra note 143, 35.
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2. The Duty to Investigate and Punish Human Rights Abuses:
Truth Commissions and the Problem of Impunity
Internationally, and especially in those countries where
democratically elected governments have succeeded governments
that committed gross and systematic human rights abuses, there
is much debate over whether the state has an obligation to in-
vestigate and punish past human rights abuses.'" Some states
have established governmental commissions called "truth com-
missions" to investigate egregious human rights abuses commit-
ted under prior governments and to provide official acknowledg-
ment of that truth.'" Other states, however, refuse to empow-
er official investigatory bodies. "7
Still, even those states that have officially investigated the
truth have passed amnesty laws barring the prosecution of the
perpetrators. In many cases government agents engaged in atro-
cious acts of torture, murder and disappearance. The agents
were granted de facto impunity when they committed the viola-
tions" and subsequent de jure immunity from prosecution by
national amnesty laws." 9 Moreover, even when current human
rights violations occur, the military personnel involved are tried
before military courts which do not usually hand down convic-
tions. This results in continued impunity."m
145. See supra notes 9, 10 and accompanying text.
146. Id. The states' duty to ensure human rights by investigating human rights
offenses can be fulfilled by an officially established "truth commission." The Truth
Commissions, established in Argentina, Chile, and El Salvador, and the Human
Rights Commissioner in Honduras, have officially revealed and acknowledged the
gross and systematic violations of human rights which occurred in those states. See
also supra note 30.
147. See Pasqualucci, supra note 9, at 321.
148. One leading commentator has stated:
In pursuance of orders, army officers enjoyed support from their com-
rades and were granted de facto immunity. When torture was performed,
the officers who carried it out counted on all the help available, including
the whole state apparatus, with the assurance that no officer would at-
tempt to stop the torment or report it.
Jaime Malamud-Goti, Trying Violators of Human Rights: The Dilemma of Transition-
al Democratic Governments, in STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON, supra note
9, at 71, 72. (The author was a senior advisor to President Alfonsin, who democrati-
cally took control of Argentina after the military dictatorship).
149. Norris, supra note 10.
150. In Latin America, military courts have not generally shown themselves to
be willing or able to provide competent, independent, and impartial justice. Rather
they have stalled and then released the alleged perpetrators. See AMERICA'S WATCH,
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The Inter-American Court made perhaps the most extensive
ruling on the states' affirmative duties under international hu-
man rights law in Veldsquez Rodriguez. 5' The Court declared
that under the American Convention, the state has a duty to
both investigate and punish human rights violations.'52 The
American Convention requires that the states parties "ensure to
all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise
of those rights and freedoms" provided for in the Convention.'"5
The Court held that under the duty to "ensure" human rights,
the state must "use the means at its disposal to carry out a seri-
ous investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction,"
and must "identify those responsible."" The Court declared in
this regard that, "[t]he State is obligated to investigate every
situation involving a violation of the rights protected by the
Convention." 15
The state's duty to investigate is independent of any possi-
ble duty to punish the violators. The Court clarified that:
[E]ven in the hypothetical case that those individually re-
sponsible for crimes of this type cannot be legally punished
under certain circumstances, the state is obligated to use the
means at its disposal to inform the relatives of the fate of the
TRUTH AND PARTIAL JUSTICE IN ARGENTINA, AN UPDATE (1991). The judges making
up the military tribunals often have a strong spirit of solidarity with the military
personnel whom they judge. Provisional Report on the Question of Impunity for the
Authors of Human Rights Violations, prepared by Sr. Guisse and Sr. Joinet, in com-
pliance with Resolution 1992/23 of the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/6, 13, (citing E/CN.4/1991/20).
Thus, they tend to justify violations, and even legitimize them in the superior inter-
est of fulfilling the mission of the armed forces. In most cases, military tribunals do
not appear capable of fulfilling the international requirement of an independent tri-
bunal. Military courts, of course, are not the only tribunals in Latin America which
may lack independence. The U.N. Truth Commission for El Salvador stated that
nation's courts were not, at the time of the report, capable of administering justice.
U.N. TRUTH COMMISSION REPORT FOR EL SALVADOR, supra note 8.
151. VelAsquez Rodriguez Case, (Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 4, j
174, 176 (1988).
152. Id. The Court further stated that, "[tihe second obligation of the States
Parties is to 'ensure' the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Con-
vention to every person subject to its jurisdiction. This obligation implies the duty of
the states parties to organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the
structures through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of jurid-
ically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights." Id. 166.
153. Supra note 11, art. 1(1).
154. Velfsquez Rodriguez Case, (Merits), T 174.
155. Id. 176.
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victims and, if they have been killed, the location of their re-
mains."
In an advisory opinion requested by the Commission, the
Court affirmed that a state may be held internationally respon-
sible when state agents comply with a domestic law which is
manifestly in violation of the American Convention.5 7 The
Court also reiterated the Nuremberg principle that state agents
are individually responsible under international law, when their
acts per se constitute an international crime." It follows that
domestic amnesty laws could not prevent the prosecution of
state agents in an international criminal court, should such a
court be established. 159
Moreover, the state may be in violation of the Convention's
duty to ensure human rights because of its failure to protect
them. In this regard the Court reasoned that:
[a]n illegal act which violated human rights and which is ini-
tially not directly imputable to a State... can lead to inter-
national responsibility of the State, not because of the act it-
self, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the
violation or to respond to it as required by the Conven-
tion.i '
Consequently, the duty to ensure human rights requires the
state to use all means at its disposal, not only to identify those
responsible for human rights violations, but also to impose on
them "appropriate punishment."'6 1 This reasoning may serve
as persuasive authority in areas where amnesty is an issue.
156. Id. 9 182. This duty continues until the person's fate is known. Id.
157. International Responsibility for the Passage and Application of Laws which
Violate the Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion 0C-14/94, December 9,
1994, 9 58(2).
158. Id.
159. See Pasqualucci, supra note 9.
160. Id. T 172. An act may not initially be imputable to the state because it
was the act of a private person or because the perpetrator of the violation has not
been identified. Id.
161. Id. 1 174. The Court did not, however, define "appropriate punishment." Id.
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3. Respect for Indigenous Cultures and Victim Reparation
The Inter-American Court has also demonstrated sensitivity
to the cultural values of indigenous peoples. Third World states
often have large indigenous populations with their own cultural
values.62 It is important for a human rights system to respect
these values to the extent that they do not conflict with indi-
vidual human rights. Although the American Convention, unlike
its African counterpart,"B generally protects only the rights of
individuals and does not concern itself directly with the corre-
sponding rights of peoples,'" the Inter-American Court has
been respectful of cultural values."m The Aloeboetoe case pro-
162. See generally Diego A. Iturralde, Los Pueblos indigenas Y Sus Derechos en
America Latina [Indigenous Peoples and Their Rights in Latin America], 15 REVISTA
INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 11 (1992).
163. The African Banjul Charter on Human and People's Rights, reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 58 (1982). The Banjul Charter specifically refers to both the rights of individ-
uals and the rights of peoples. Articles 2-17 protect individual rights. Articles 19-24
protect peoples rights. For example, Article 19 provides that, "[aill peoples shall be
equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the same rights. Nothing
shall justify the domination of a people by another." Id. See generally Thomas
Buergenthal & Pedro Nikken, El Sistema Africano de los Derechos Humanos y de
Los Pueblos, [The African System of Human Rights and Its Nations], 79 REVISTA DE
LA FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS JURIDICAS Y POLTICAS, UNIVERSIDAD CENTRAL DE VENE-
ZUELA 267, 274, 275 (1991) (stating that the majority of the peoples' rights contained
in the Banjul Charter can be characterized as "third generation" rights, such as the
right to self-determination (art. 20), the right to a "satisfactory environment favor-
able to their development" (art. 24), and the right to "national and international
peace and security" (art. 23)).
Conversely, the American and European Conventions focus primarily on the
rights of the individual.
164. The rights protected by the American Convention are generally civil and
political rights, such as the rights to life, personal liberty, due process, and humane
treatment. However, the Convention contains a provision steering states toward full
realization of economic, social, and cultural rights. American Convention, supra note
11, art. 26. These rights usually include, inter alia, the rights to work, an adequate
standard of living, enough to eat, an education, and the rights of peoples to self-
determination and to freely pursue economic, social, and cultural development. Fur-
thermore, an additional Protocol to the American Convention - the Protocol of San
Salvador - protects these rights. Protocol of San Salvador, American Convention,
reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 11, at 67. The San Salvador Protocol has
not entered into force as of this date. See THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES (James Crawford
ed., 1988) for a comprehensive discussion of people's rights. See also Guillermo
Fernandez de Soto, La Protecci6n de Los Derechos Colectivos en el Sisterna
Interamericano, in LA CORTE Y EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANOS DE DERECHOS
HUMANOS, at 133.
165. Latin America has several populations of indigenous peoples, ranging up-
ward to more than 50% of the total national population in certain countries such as
Guatemala.
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vides a good example.166 Aloeboetoe involved the kidnapping by
the Surinamese military of seven young men of the Saramaca
tribe, a tribe inhabiting the bush country of Suriname and made
up of descendants of African slaves. The military forced the men
to dig their own graves and then murdered them.167 Suriname
accepted liability for the deaths, leaving reparations as the only
issue to be decided by the Court.'
The Court considered tribal law in apportioning compensa-
tion to the victims' next of kin. 6' Rules of succession, which
identify the decedent's beneficiaries, are generally determined
under local law. Surinamese national law provides that a
victim's next of kin includes the legally recognized spouse, the
children, and perhaps dependent parents of the victims. Surina-
me does not recognize polygamy. 7' Under Saramaca tribal cus-
toms, however, polygamy is common, and marriages are not reg-
istered with the government.7 ' The tribe generally follows its
own rules and is not aware of national laws. Moreover, even had
the tribe wished to comply with governmental requirements, the
Surinamese government did not provide accessible facilities to
officially register births, deaths, and marriages.'72
The Court determined that official Surinamese family law
was not effective in the region and was, therefore, not the local
law for the purposes of the case. Consequently, the Court consid-
ered Saramaca customs in order to determine the next of
kin.73 In accordance with the local tribal law of succession, the
Court ordered that reparations be paid to all the wives, children,
and in some cases, the parents of the victims.'74 The Court did
not go so far as to accept the Commission's argument that under
tribal customs, "a person is a member not only of his or her own
family group, but also of his or her own village, community and
tribal group" and, therefore, that damages should be paid not
166. Aloeboetoe Case, (Reparations), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 15 (1993).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. A victim who survived for five days after the attack described the
events. Id. S 6.
170. Marriages must be officially registered to be recognized by the state. Id.
17.
171. Id.
172. Id. 9 58.
173. Id. ' 62.
174. Id. 9 66.
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only to the victim's immediate family but to the entire tribe. 75
Nor would the Court give effect to those customs which would
contravene the provision against gender discrimination in the
American Convention.
76
Even beyond considering tribal customs, the Court has tak-
en into account the cultural values reflected in the social and
economic setting of much of rural Latin America. In these re-
gions, many couples do not legally marry, fathers "recognize"
and support children out of wedlock, and parents in their old age
are often dependent on adult children. The Court appeared will-
ing to take some social customs into account when determining
reparations in the Honduran disappearances. In the damages
phase of that case, it asked that the government provide the
names of the victims' wives as well as those "of any concubines
recognized in any official document."77 The Court also noted
that if one of the victims had a child other than those conceived
in matrimony, as had been mentioned at the public hearing, that
child should share in the indemnification.
178
Furthermore, in Aloeboetoe the Court considered the poverty
in the Saramaca's locale in setting reparations. The Court re-
quired that the Government reopen and staff the school and
health dispensary in the area where the victims' families
lived."'
The Court, however, has not advanced the international law
of reparations by creating a fund to pay the victims of gross and
systematic human rights abuses."8 In a state where gross and
systematic violations are common, there are often several vic-
tims of the same offense. All of their cases, however, cannot be
referred to an international court that can order reparations to
175. Id. 83.
176. Id. 62. There has been much scholarly debate and some case law on
whether a people which has traditionally discriminated on the basis of gender should
be permitted to do so under international law. See FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID
WELSSBRODT, INTERNATioNAL HuMAN RIGHTs 61-100 (1988).
177. VelAsquez Rodriguez Case, (Compensatory Damages), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser.
C, No. 7, 63(1) (1988); American Convention, supra note 11, 13.
178. Id. $ 55.
179. Aloeboetoe Case, (Reparations), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 15, res. 5
(1993).
180. Vellisquez Rodriguez Case, (Compensatory Damages), 7 (in which the wife
of Manfredo Velisquez Rodriguez requested that a fund be established to pay for the
education of the children of the disappeared in Honduras).
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the families. For instance, the Inter-American Court sits only
part-time and cannot consider all the human rights complaints
initially filed with the Commission. Thus, the Commission is
more likely to send sample cases to the Court. This is especially
problematic in regard to reparations, where only one or two
families out of many who suffered similar abuses will receive
compensation. Normally in such cases, domestic courts should
order the state to pay reparations. However, this usually does
not occur.181 Honduran Human Rights Commissioner Leo
Valladares, in his official report on the disappearances in Hon-
duras, stated that it was patently unfair "that only those whose
cases were before the Inter-American Court received repara-
tions, and that all of the proven cases of disappearances should
receive economic reparations."'82 Theo Van Boven, who studied
victim reparations for the U.N., also suggested that it is "nec-
essary that, in addition to individual means of reparation, ade-
quate provision be made to entitle groups of victims or victim-
ized communities to present collective claims for damages and to
receive collective reparation accordingly."1" In the inter-Amer-
ican system, where gross violations of human rights have often
occurred, the Court could advance international human rights by
instituting a means to compensate such victims.
The American Convention requires that a government do
more than pay financial compensation to the injured party.'" 4
The Convention also requires that the government ensure the
injured party the enjoyment of the right violated and, if appro-
priate, that it remedy the situation that caused the violation."M
In Veldsquez Rodriguez, the Court interpreted the Convention
181. Argentina established laws to provide reparation to the victims of human
rights abuses and their families. Argentine Law 23,466 granted pensions to the fami-
lies of the disappeared; Argentine Law 24,043 provides compensatory damages for
persons arrested under orders from the National Executive Power or civilians arrest-
ed by warrants issued by a military tribunal. Inter-Am. Comm. H. R., Argentine
Report No. 28/92 (October 2, 1992) reprinted in 13 HuM. RTS. L. J., 336, (1992).
182. THE FACTs SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES, supra note 8, at 234. Valladares sug-
gested that the government of Honduras should provide reparation to all the fami-
lies of the victims.
183. Van Boven Report, supra note 136, § VII (The Issue of Impunity in Rela-
tion to the Right to Reparation For Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights,
Review of Further Developments in Fields With Which the Sub-Commission Has
Been Concerned, Commission on Human Rights).
184. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 63(1).
185. Id.
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provision on victim reparation to comply with the general princi-
ple of international law that every violation causing harm cre-
ates a duty to make adequate reparation.8" The Court made
clear that adequate reparation in the case of a human rights
violation requires the state to make full restitution.'87 Full res-
titution includes "the restoration of the prior situation, the repa-
ration of the consequences of the violation, and indemnification
for patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages, including emo-
tional harm."'8 Within this duty, the Court included the
state's duties to investigate human rights violations and to pun-
ish those directly responsible.8 " The Court did not, however,
expressly incorporate these duties in the resolutions of the judg-
ment on the merits or even in the resolutions on compensatory
damages. 9 '
More recently, the Court seems to be limiting its decisions
on reparations to orders that the state make financial payments
and other forms of economic compensation to the victims. This
limitation is contrary to both the wording of the Convention 9'
and the Court's statements in Veldsquez Rodriguez. In
Aloeboetoe,92 the Court appears to distance itself from its
Veldsquez position by stating that "the rule of in integrum resti-
tutio" [full restitution] is "one way in which the effect of an in-
ternational unlawful act may be redressed, but it is not the only
way in which it must be redressed, for in certain cases such
reparation may not be possible, sufficient or appropriate."g
Subsequent to the Honduran cases, the Court has never referred
186. Velfisquez Rodriguez Case, (Compensatory Damages), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser.
C, No. 7, T 25 (1988).
187. Id T 26. Full restitution is also called restitutio in integrum. Id.
188. Id- 26.
189. Id. 1 34.
190. Id. 9 35. The Court simply stated that "the bases of a judicial decision are
a part of the same. Consequently, the Court declares that those obligations [to in-
vestigate and punish] on the part of Honduras continue until they are fully carried
out". Id.
191. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 63(1) requires not only the pay-
ment of "fair compensation," but also "if appropriate, that the consequences of the
measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be rem-
edied." Article 63(1) also provides that the victim be assured the enjoyment of the
right violated. Id. This, of course, is not possible in the case of a violation of the
right to life.
192. Aloeboetoe Case, (Reparations), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 15.
193. Id. 9 49 (emphasis in original).
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to the state's duties to investigate violations and to punish those
responsible.'94 In the El Amparo Case, in which the govern-
ment of Venezuela took responsibility for the violation of the
right to life of seventeen fisherman, the Court did not reach the
issue of whether sections of the Venezuelan Code of Military
Justice were compatible with the American Convention.'95 The
Court simply ordered that Venezuela and the Commission decide
on reparations and compensation. 96 The Court's message could
be interpreted to allow a state to violate human rights with
impunity provided that it is willing to make reparations with
taxpayers' money.
The Court has also refused to order state payment of
victims' attorneys fees. In Aloeboetoe, the Court made a stinging
and seemingly unjustified rebuke to the Commission in response
to its request for state payment of fees to the victims' coun-
sel.'97 The Court stated that if the Commission fulfilled its
function by "contracting outside professionals instead of using its
own staff," it could not demand attorney's fees.'98 In fact, the
Commission had not contracted the services of Dr. Grossman,
the outside attorney. Although he was designated as "legal a-
visor" to the Commission, he represented two NGOs.'9 9 The
Commission has now established the Inter-American Human
Rights Foundation, which will identify a pool of lawyers in the
Western Hemisphere who are willing to work pro bono on cases
194. In Aloeboetoe, however, the victims' bodies had not been returned to their
families for proper burial, and the Court did quote the following from Veldsquez:
"the State is obligated to use the means at its disposal to inform the relatives of
the fate of the victims and . . . the location of their remains." Id. T 9. (quoting
VelAsquez Rodriguez Case, (Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 7, 181 (1988)).
195. See El Amparo Case (Venezuela), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, 9 4 (1995) (on
file with author), to be reprinted in the Annual Report of the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights (1995). Judge Cancado Trindade, a well-known international law
scholar, filed a concurring opinion, stating that the Court should have reserved the
right to decide on the compatibility of certain sections of the Venezuelan Military
Code with the American Convention.
196. Id. res. 2. The Venezuelan military has since promoted one of the officers
who was in charge of the battalion that committed the murders. Thomas
Buergenthal, Lecture on Human Rights at George Washington University School of
Law (Sept. 29, 1995) (notes on file with the author).
197. Aloeboetoe Case, (Reparations), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 15 (1993).
198. Id. 114.
199. See David Padilla, Reparations in Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, 17 HUM. RTS. Q.
541, 548-9 (1995) (stating that "the Court made a serious mistake of fact, confusing
the role of the Commission's legal advisor .... ").
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before the Commission and the Court.
B. Procedural and Evidentiary Precedents
Several of the Court's most important precedents deal with
procedural issues. As the Convention provides a detailed list of
the substantive rights of individuals, the Court's clarification of
the procedures which must be followed for the effective enforce-
ment of those rights has proven significant.
1. Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
The Court has clarified issues of the burden of proof and the
scope of exceptions to the international principle of exhaustion of
domestic remedies. This principle requires an individual to ex-
haust all available state remedies before turning to international
law.2"' Under the American Convention "the remedies under
domestic law must have been pursued and exhausted in accor-
dance with generally recognized principles of international
law."' Thus, a victim of human rights abuse must normally
be denied redress in the local legal system before filing a com-
plaint with an international body. This generally recognized rule
allows a state to attempt resolution of the case under its inter-
nal law before being confronted with an international proceed-
ing.202 The requirement that the victim exhaust domestic reme-
dies is based, however, on the presumption that effective domes-
tic remedies are in fact available.
Victims and their family members frequently encounter
difficulties in pursuing domestic remedies. These difficulties are
especially severe when the victims have been forcibly disap-
peared. In Veldsquez Rodriguez, the victim's family unsuccessful-
ly filed three writs of habeas corpus0 3 and two criminal com-
200. See American Convention, supra note 11, art. 46(1)(a); European Conven-
tion, supra note 25, art. 26; African Banjul Charter on Human and People's Rights,
arts. 50 and 56(5) reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982); and First Protocol to the United
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 2 and 5(2)(b)
reprinted in 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 383 (1967).
201. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 46(1)(a).
202. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, (Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 4, 1 35,
36-37 (1988).
203. Habeas Corpus is the normal legal "means of finding a person presumably
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plaints before turning to the inter-American system."t 4 The
government of Honduras, however, claimed that domestic reme-
dies had not been exhausted because the writs of habeas corpus
required the petitioner to identify both the place of detention
and the detaining authority. 2 5 The petitioners were unable to
do so because of the clandestine nature of the detention.0 8
When a state alleges non-exhaustion of domestic remedies,
the Inter-American Court places the burden of proof on the state
to show that effective remedies remain to the complainant."°
This is a reasonable allocation of the burden. The state is in the
best position to access information on the availability and effec-
tiveness of any untested internal remedies. If the government
specifies which remedies the petitioner did not exhaust, then the
burden shifts to the petitioner to show that the remedies were
indeed exhausted or that they could not be exhausted due to one
of the exceptions listed in the Convention."' Consequently, the
Court continues to observe tenets of state sovereignty, but does
not permit the government to place the burden on the petitioner
merely by alleging failure to exhaust domestic remedies.
Moreover, the Court has held that if a state alleges such failure,
it is subsequently estopped from claiming that the petition is in-
admissible due to the requirement that it be lodged with the
Commission within six months of the exhaustion of domestic
remedies.2"
detained by the authorities, of ascertaining whether he is legally detained and, given
the case, of obtaining his liberty." Id. 65.
204. Id. T 55.
205. Id. 52.
206. In the case of disappearances, the government usually holds the victim in
clandestine detention centers. Thus it is impossible for the petitioner to identify the
place of detention. See NUNCA MAS, supra note 131, at 479 (the Commission verified
that hundreds of clandestine detention centers were used by the government during
what has become known as the "dirty war").
207. Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, (Preliminary Objections), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser.
C, No. 1, T 88 (1987) cited with approval in VelAsquez Rodriguez Case, (Merits),
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 4, T 59 (1988).
There is a division of authority between international human rights bodies as
to which party shall bear the burden of proof when the parties disagree as to the
exhaustion of domestic remedies. For discussion of the burden of proof in claims of
exhaustion of domestic remedies in the European system and before the U.N. Hu-
man Rights Committee, see DAVIDSON, supra note 57, at 71-73. The European Hu-
man Rights Commission generally places the burden on the petitioner, while the
United Nations Human Rights Committee requires that the state demonstrate the
specific domestic remedies still available to the complainant. Id.
208. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, (Merits), 60.
209. Neira Alegria et al. v. Peru, (Preliminary Objections), I-A. C.H.R., T 29
[Vol. 26:2336
1994-95] INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS
The Court has specified that only those domestic remedies
which are "adequate" in a specific case need be exhausted. 1' A
domestic remedy is adequate only if it is suitable to address the
infringement of the specific legal right allegedly violated.2 '
The Court reasoned that a norm should not be interpreted "to
lead to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable."2"
In the case of disappearances, although habeas corpus is the
normal remedy used to locate a person detained by the authori-
ties, if the writ requires the identification of the detention area,
"it would not be adequate for finding a person clandestinely held
by State officials, since in such cases there is only hearsay evi-
dence of the detention, and the whereabouts of the victim is
unknown.
,2 13
Furthermore, the remedy must also be effective, meaning
that it is capable of producing the anticipated result.214 Accord-
ing to the Court, habeas corpus cannot be considered an effective
remedy if it is not applied impartially by the government, or if
the party invoking it is thereby placed in danger.1 ' Resorting
to domestic remedies becomes a "senseless formality" if they "are
denied for trivial reasons or without an examination of the mer-
its, or if there is proof of the existence of a practice or policy
ordered or tolerated by the government." '16 Specifically in the
case of disappearances, the Court found that the remedies of-
fered in Honduras were ineffective because "the imprisonment
was clandestine; formal requirements made them inapplicable in
practice; the authorities against whom they were brought simply
ignored them, or because attorneys and judges were threatened
and intimidated by those authorities." 7 In such a case, excep-
tions would be applicable, and the petitioner would not be re-
(1991) reprinted in 13 HuM. RTS. L. J. 146, 148 (1992). The American Convention,
supra note 11, provides that a petition must be lodged with the Commission within
a "period of six months from the date on which the party alleging violation of his
rights was notified of the final judgment," or the petition is inadmissible. Id. art.
(46)(1)(b).




214. Id. T 66.
215. Id.




quired to prove exhaustion."8
Generally recognized legal principles and the American
-Convention establish exceptions to the exhaustion of domestic
remedies when appropriate.219 For instance, in locales where
due process 'of law does not exist for protection of the right vio-
lated, it is not necessary for the applicant to prove exhaus-
tion.22 Exceptions also apply when local authorities deny ac-
cess to or prevent a party from exhausting such remedies, or
when there is unwarranted delay in the rendering of a final
domestic judgment.22'
The Court provided additional clarification regarding when
exceptions are applicable within the particular situation of de-
veloping states. In an advisory opinion request, the Commission
asked the Court to determine whether domestic remedies must
be exhausted when the petitioner is indigent or unable to obtain
legal representation because of a generalized fear in the legal
community. 2 With respect to indigence, the Court stated that
the American Convention guarantees the exercise of rights pro-
tected by the Convention, without discrimination based on "eco-
nomic status."2" The Court held that if a person must have le-
gal representation or pay filing fees in order to exhaust domestic
remedies, and she does not have the financial ability, the state
must "organize the governmental apparatus"2 so as to permit
her to do so.225 Otherwise, the victim's indigence may trigger
an exception to the duty of exhaustion.'26
Moreover, when a claimant is unable to secure legal repre-
218. Id. 68.
219. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 46(2).
220. Id. at 46(2)(a).
221. Id. at 46(2)(b).
222. See Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies, Advisory Opinion,
supra note 93.
223. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 1(1).
224. The Court in Veldsquez Rodriguez found that states parties to the Conven-
tion have a duty "to organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the
structures through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of jurid-
ically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights." Vel~squez Rodriguez
Case, (Merits), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Ser. C, No. 4, 9 175 (1988) cited with approval
in Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies, Advisory Opinion supra note
93, 23.
225. Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies, Advisory Opinion,
supra note 93, $ 30.
226. Id.
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sentation because of a generalized atmosphere of fear, in which
"lawyers do not accept cases which they believe could place their
own lives and those of their families in jeopardy," the state may
be in violation not only of its affirmative duty to protect human
rights, but also to "ensure" them.227 In such a case, the Court
stated that the claimant would also be absolved of the duty to
exhaust domestic remedies.228
2. The Court's Balancing of Victim's Rights and Procedural
Regularity
The Inter-American Court has specified that the object and
purpose of the American Convention is the protection of the
individual's human rights. In an oft-quoted explanation of the
singular nature of human rights treaties, the Court held that:
[M]odern human rights treaties in general, and the American
Convention in particular, are not multilateral treaties of the
traditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal ex-
change of rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting
states. Their object and purpose is the protection of the basic
rights of individuial human beings, irrespective of their na-
tionality, both against the State of their nationality and all
other contracting States. In concluding these human rights
treaties, the States can be deemed to submit themselves to a
legal order within which they, for the common good, assume
various obligations, not in relation to other states, but to-
wards all individuals within their jurisdiction .... '
The Court and Commission, in enforcing the individual's
basic rights, must do so within the "legal order" established by
the American Convention. A state has a legitimate expectation
that the procedures stipulated in the Convention will be fol-
lowed. State parties before the Court often request that the case
be dismissed because of the Commission's failure to follow cer-
227. Id. 34. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 1(1), provides that [t]he
States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms rec-
ognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and
full exercise of those rights and freedoms ..
228. Id. 35.
229. The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Conven-
tion, (arts. 74, 75, American Convention of Human Rights), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Advi-
sory Opinion OC-2/82, Ser. A, No. 2, T 29 (1982).
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tain procedures mandated by the Convention.2 3' These proce-
dures are interposed to protect both the victim and state sover-
eignty, and as such, any deviation from the requirements must
be considered carefully. The Court has held, however, that the
Convention must be interpreted in favor of the individual,23" '
and thus it has refused to take a strictly formalistic view of
procedural requirements. The Court made clear that "the proce-
dural system is a means of attaining justice and that the latter
cannot be sacrificed for the sake of mere formalities." 32 Fur-
thermore, the Court stated that "failure to observe certain for-
malities is not necessarily relevant when dealing on the interna-
tional plane."233 What is essential is that "the conditions neces-
sary for the preservation of the procedural rights of the parties
not be diminished or unbalanced and that the objectives of the
different procedures be met."2 4
In this regard, the Court has made several procedural rul-
ings. The Court held that the Commission need not make an
express and formal determination of the admissibility of a peti-
tion unless the government made an issue of admissibility at the
time.23 5 Additionally, the Court held that the Commission is
not required to attempt a friendly settlement unless, at the
Commission's sole discretion, it determines it is suitable or nec-
230. See VelAsquez Rodriguez Case, (Preliminary Objections), Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Ser. C, No. 1 (1987); see also American Convention, supra note 11, arts. 46-51 for
procedures before the Commission.
231. The Court applies the rules of treaty interpretation set out in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1990), reprinted in CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra
note 19, at 53 (1994). See also Restrictions to the Death Penalty (arts. 4(2) & 4(4)),
American Convention on Human Rights, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Advisory Opinion OC-3/83,
Ser. A, No. 3. 18 (1983).
The Inter-American Court has stated that, "[t he Convention has a purpose -
the international protection of the basic rights of human beings", which "requires
that the Convention be interpreted in favor of the individual, who is the object of
international protection, as long as such an interpretation does not result in a modi-
fication of the system." Government of Costa Rica (In the Matter of Viviana
Gallardo, et al.), Inter-Am. C.H.R., No. G 101/81, $ 16 (1981).
232. Cayara Case, (Preliminary Objections), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 14,
42, reprinted in 14 HUM. RTS. L. J. 159 (1993) cited with approval in Certain At-
tributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (arts. 41, 42, 46, 47,
50, and 51 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-13,
1 43, July 16, 1993.
233. Id. $ 33.
234. Id.
235. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, (Preliminary Objections), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser.
C, No. 1, 1 40 (1987); see American Convention, supra note 11, art. 48(1).
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essary under the circumstances.23 The Court reasoned that in
the case of a disappearance in which the state denies involve-
ment or knowledge of the person, "it is very difficult to reach a
friendly settlement that will reflect respect for the rights to life,
to humane treatment, and to personal liberty."237 In a subse-
quent case, the Court seemed to backtrack in holding that the
Commission could only exercise its discretion not to initiate a
friendly settlement in "exceptional cases" and for good rea-
son.238 However, the Court refused to dismiss the case on the
basis of the Commission's failure to initiate a friendly settle-
ment, because under the Regulations of the Commission, the
government also had the authority to request a friendly set-
tlement.2" The Court aptly stated that, "[o]ne cannot demand
of another an action that one could have taken under the very
same conditions but chose not to."2" The Court also held that
on-site investigations are not mandatory under the Conven-
tion. 41 Thus, the Commission has discretion to conduct such a
factual investigation.24
Nevertheless, the Court insists on certain formalities to
protect the system's integrity. This has resulted in the removal
of some cases alleging egregious violations. In the Cayara case
against Peru, the Commission alleged that in retaliation for a
guerilla ambush by the Shining Path the Peruvian military
entered a village in the highlands and murdered the first man
they saw.2" According to the application, the military then
shot five men in the village church. Later, when other men re-
turned from the fields the soldiers murdered them with bayonets
236. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, (Preliminary Objections), J 45. The Court stated,
however, that the Commission's power could not be exercised arbitrarily. Id. See
American Convention, supra note 11, art. 48(1)(f) (for provision on friendly settle-
ments).
237. Id. 1 46.
238. Caballero Delgado Case, (Preliminary Objections), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C,
No. 17, 27 (1994).
239. Id. IT 29-30. See Regulations of the Commission, supra note 118, art. 45(1),
at 119.
240. Id. 1 30.
241. Velisquez Rodriguez, (Preliminary Objections), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No.
1, 9 49 (1987).
242. Id. Furthermore, the Court ruled that it was not necessary for the Com-
mission to hold a preliminary hearing before the issuance of a report unless request-
ed by the parties. Id. 1 53.
243. Cayara Case, (Preliminary Objections), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 14
(1993).
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and farm tools.'" In all, between twenty-eight and thirty-one
persons were killed in one day.2" Subsequently, witnesses
were arrested and disappeared or murdered.2" As a prelimi-
nary objection, the government demanded that the case be dis-
missed because the Commission had not complied with the time-
limit for case submissions. The Commission had submitted the
case and then withdrawn it, submitting it again at a later
date.247
Although the Court reasoned that some delays and omis-
sions in complying with Convention procedures might be ex-
cused, it determined that to "preserve a fair balance between the
protection of human rights, which is the ultimate purpose of the
system, and the legal certainty and procedural equity that will
ensure the stability and reliability of the international protec-
tion mechanism," the case had to be dismissed. 2' The Court
explained that "[w]ithout falling into a rigid formalism which
distorts the purpose and object of the Convention, the states and
the organs of the Convention must comply with the provisions
which regulate the procedure, for the juridical security of the
parties depend upon it."49
Despite the extreme nature of the dismissal, particularly
with such serious allegations at stake, some experts on the in-
ter-American system support the Court's decision and its con-
cern for improved procedural regularity by the Commission.50
244. Id.
245. Id. 15.
246. Id. 9] 16-18.
247. Id.
248. Id. 63. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 51(1) provides:
If, within a period of three months from the date of the transmittal of
the report of the Commission to the States concerned, the matter has not
either been settled or submitted by the Commission or by the State con-
cerned to the Court and its jurisdiction accepted, the Commission may,
by the vote of an absolute majority of its members, set forth its opinion
and conclusions concerning the question submitted for its consideration.
249. Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Ad-
visory Opinion, OC-13, 9 41 (1993) (citing to Cayara Case, (Preliminary Objections),
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 14, $T 42, 63 (1993)).
If, however, the state requests an extension which results in the expiration of
a Convention mandated deadline, the Court held that principles of good faith which
govern international relations prohibit the state from invoking the expiration of the
deadline as a preliminary exception to the consideration of the case on the merits.
Neira Alegria Case, (Preliminary Objections), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 13, $ 34
(1991), reprinted in 13 HuM. RTS. L.J., 146, 148 (1992).
250. Dinah Shelton, The Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human
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One study found that the Commission's "manipulation and disre-
gard of regulations has led to slipshod handling of cases, with
results that encourage disrespect and create legal difficulties for
the Commission."25' These stricter procedural demands may
result in a more efficient system which will better protect hu-
man rights; provided of course that the Court does not go too far
in considering form over substance.
3. The Court's Consideration of Evidence
Perpetrators of disappearances attempt to avoid accountabil-
ity by eliminating all evidence of the kidnapping or of the
victim's fate. 52 Consequently, the complainant can seldom pro-
vide direct evidence. Evidentiary issues of the initial burden and
standard of proof become crucial in establishing government
responsibility. In the Honduran cases, the Inter-American Court
complied with basic principles of law which assign the burden of
proof to the party making the allegations.25 The Court created
a two-prong test to satisfy this burden. Under the first prong,
the Inter-American Commission, which is usually the complain-
ant alleging the disappearance of a particular individual, must
show that the state engaged in an official practice of disappear-
ances or at least tolerated such a practice. 4 Under the second
prong, the Commission must establish a link between the
individual's disappearance and the state practice."
In the Honduran cases, the Commission established that a
state practice of disappearances existed. It proved to the Court
that between one-hundred and one-hundred-fifty persons were
disappeared in Honduras from 1981 to 1984.25 It further
proved that "[iut was public and notorious knowledge in Hondu-
ras that the kidnappings were carried out by military personnel
or the police, or persons acting under their orders." 7 The vic-
Rights, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 333, 343 (1994).
251. Committee on International Human Rights: The Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights: A Promise Unfulfilled, 48 THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 607, 608.
252. Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, (Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 4, D 130
(1988).
253. Id. 1 124.
254. Id. 91 125.
255. Id.
256. Id. I 147(a).
257. Id. S. 147(b) & (c). In THE FACTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES, supra note 8,
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tims, many of whom had been under surveillance before their
disappearances, were often labor leaders, student leaders, or
persons that the government deemed a threat to state securi-
ty. 58 The kidnappers drove vehicles with tinted glass, which
required official authorization, and carried arms reserved for use
by the police and military.259 At times, state security agents
cleared the areas just prior to the kidnappings.
260
The Commission then established a link between the gov-
ernmental policy and the disappearance of the particular vic-
tims. In Veldsquez Rodriguez, the Commission demonstrated the
requisite link by showing that the victim was a student leader
who had been under governmental surveillance and was kid-
napped in broad daylight under circumstances similar to those
shown under the first prong of the test to be common in Hondu-
ras at that time. 8'
When the Commission has met its burden of proof, a rebut-
table presumption is raised that the government was responsible
for the disappearance.262 The burden then shifts to the govern-
ment to refute the presumption.2" The government may do so
by showing that the alleged victim was not the type of person
who was traditionally disappeared or that there are other likely
reasons for the disappearance. Honduras, however, did not pres-
ent evidence to rebut the presumption in Veldsquez Rodriguez.
The nature of the evidence the Court accepts to establish
governmental responsibility for a disappearance is not limited to
direct testimonial or documentary evidence.2 ' In cases where
Leo Valladares, the Honduran National Commissioner for the Protection of Human
Rights, compliments the Honduras press for its thorough reporting of human rights
violations and disappearances.
258. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, (Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 4,
147(i) (1988). The usual targets of the state-sponsored violence included opposition
political groups, union leaders, student leaders, religious persons who assisted the
poor, and virtually anyone who threatened the status quo. THE FACTS SPEAK FOR
THEMSELVES, supra note 8, at 217.
259. Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, (Merits), 147(ii).
260. Id
261. Id. $ 147.
262. Thomas Buergenthal, Judicial Fact-Finding: Inter-American Human Rights
Court, in FACT-FINDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 261, 269 (Richard Lillich
ed., 1991) (Buergenthal was President of the Inter-American Court during consider-
ation of the Honduran cases).
263. Id.
264. VelAsquez Rodriguez Case, (Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 4, 9 130
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the perpetrators have made every effort to eliminate evi-
dence,' the Court has emphasized the value of circumstantial
evidence, indicia, and presumptions." As international legal
proceedings are generally less formal than their domestic coun-
terparts,6 7 the Court will consider any evidence that leads to
conclusions consistent with the facts. 2' The Court has been
liberal in considering most of the evidence proffered by the par-
ties, despite objections that such evidence would not be accepted
in a state's domestic court.269 In Veldsquez Rodriguez, the
Court considered newspaper clippings as corroborative evi-
dence.270 It also considered testimony proffered by relatives of
the victims, witnesses with criminal records, and witnesses
whom the government claimed were disloyal simply by virtue of
their willingness to testify.27' Some of the testimony referred to
other related kidnappings and torture practices. One death
squad member, in a classic offering of hearsay, stated that he
had been told of the capture of Manfredo Veldsquez Rodriguez,
although he did not directly participate in the disappear-
ance.272 The Court reserved the right to consider all evidence
and to weigh its probative value.7' The Court expressed
especially strong disagreement with the government's position
that an individual's testimony before the Court was evidence of
disloyalty to the nation. 74
The Court has the authority to establish its own evidentiary
standard of proof.27' The standard established in the Honduran




267. Id. 9 128. In proceedings before the Court, the Court has repeatedly stated
that international law, rather than the domestic law of the state charged, is applica-
ble. Id. 9 132.
268. Id. 91 130.
269. Id. T9 141-42. The Court emphasized that it is an international tribunal
and that, therefore, "[a]U the elements of domestic legal procedures are . . . not
automatically applicable." Id. 9 132.
270. Id. 9 146.
271. Id. 9 141-44.
272. Id. 99 113, 119.
273. Id. 9 138.
274. Id. 9 144.
275. Neither the American Convention, the Statute of the Court, nor the Rules
of Procedure of the Court address standards of proof.
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tion in a convincing manner."276 The Court determined that
this standard, stricter than the "preponderance of the evidence"
test but weaker than "beyond a reasonable doubt,"277 reflected
the seriousness of the finding that the government had engaged
in or tolerated a policy of disappearances.278 The Court left
open the issue of whether it would establish different standards
in less serious cases.
The Court initially placed the burden on the state to pro-
duce evidence over which the state has exclusive control. It held
that "[i]n contrast to domestic criminal law, in proceedings to
determine human rights violations the state cannot rely on the
defense that the complainant has failed to present evidence
when it cannot be obtained without the State's cooperation."
280
Recently, however, the Court apparently departed from this
sound evidentiary ruling. In Gangaram Panday, the Court put
the burden on the Commission to prove what occurred when the
victim was illegally detained by governmental authorities and
held incommunicado.281 In this case, a Surinamese citizen was
detained by authorities at the airport on his return to the coun-
try. He was later found hanged by the neck in his cell.8 The
Commission alleged that the victim was tortured and that the
Government was liable for his death.2" The Government, on
the other hand, alleged that the victim had committed sui-
cide.' " The Court unanimously found that, based on inference,
the detention was illegal." In its split 4-3 decision, however,
the Court held that the Government was not responsible for a
violation of the victim's right to life.28 ' The expert evidence was
276. Id. 129.
277. Buergenthal, supra note 262, at 271-72.
278. VelAsquez Rodriguez Case, (Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 4, 9 129
(1988).
279. See Buergenthal, supra note 262, at 272.
280. Velfisquez Rodriguez Case, (Merits), 135.
281. Gangaram Panday Case against Suriname, Judgment of January 21, 1994,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., 68, reprinted in 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 168 (1994).
282. Id. 3.
283. Id. 9 52, 58.
284. Id. % 3.
285. Id. T 68; 9 1 of the holdings of the Court.
286. Id. 3 of the holdings of the Court. Three of the seven participating judges
dissented, stating that:
It is our opinion that from the very moment that the Court established
the responsibility of the respondent State for the illegal detention of Mr.
Gangaram Panday, albeit by inference, it became necessary for it to ac-
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contradictory, and, therefore, the Commission had not proved its
case.287 In this case, due to the illegal detention coupled with
the Government's intentional incommunicado holding of the
victim, the evidence as to what actually happened to the victim
was solely in the hands of the Government. Consequently, in ac-
cordance with the Court's Veldsquez Rodriguez holding Surina-
me should not have been permitted to rely on the Commission's
failure to present evidence as to the cause of death. Rather, the
Court should have established a rebuttable presumption that, at
least in cases of illegal incommunicado detention, the state must
bear the burden of showing that the subsequent death was not
at the hands of the government. If the government shows this,
then the burden would shift to the complainant to show that the
government had violated the victim's right to life. In the case of
inconclusive evidence, the state would not likely satisfy its bur-
den, and it would be held liable.2"
Furthermore, the Court may have unwittingly discouraged
governments from supplying requested information if such infor-
mation is detrimental to its case. The Court had previously
ruled in Veldsquez Rodriguez that in international human rights
law, if the state, which has the duty to protect the rights of the
victims, remains silent or provides elusive or ambiguous an-
swers, it "may imply acknowledgement of the truth of the allega-
tions."289 In Gangaram Panday, the Court requested that the
government of Suriname provide it with a copy of the Suriname
Constitution and the substantive laws and criminal procedure in
force in Suriname at the time of the detention.2" When the
Government did not produce the information, the Court had no
direct evidence to determine if the detention was illegal under
the Constitution of Suriname.29' Consequently, the illegal de-
cept the consequences of such a finding insofar as the protection of the
victim's right to life is concerned.
Id. (Judges Picado-Sotela, Aguiar-Aranguren, and Cancado Trindade, dissenting).
287. Id. T9 59-61.
288. For arguments that this decision not only retreats from the Court's earlier
evidentiary framework but also conflicts with customary norms of state responsibility
for the treatment of aliens, see Shelton, supra note 250, at 352.
289. Gangaram Panday Case against Suriname, Judgment of January 21, 1994,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., 138, reprinted in 15 HuM. RTS. L.J. 168 (1994) ("so long as the
contrary is not indicated by the record or is not compelled as a matter of law"). Id.
290. Id. $ 33. The Surinamese Constitution is written in Dutch, which is not an
official language of the OAS.
291. Id. 99 48, 50. Although local law is not usually the determining factor
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tention was not proved, and the Court "inferred" such to be the
case.292 Although this aspect of the Court's determination was
positive for the development of international human rights law,
the Court then went on to award only nominal indemnification
due to the inference.293 This could lead to an unfortunate re-
sult. When the Court requests that a state produce incriminat-
ing evidence, the state might choose to withhold it in order to
limit reparations to only nominal amounts.294 This would be
counterproductive to the system. Court rulings should encourage
state compliance.
before an international court, in the case of detention the American Convention
provides that [no one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the rea-
sons and under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of the
State Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto." American Conven-
tion, supra note 11, art. 7(2). Thus it was necessary for the Court to determine the
law of Suriname to determine if the detention was illegal.
292. Gangaram Panday Case against Suriname, Judgment of January 21, 1994,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., T 51, reprinted in 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 168 (1994).
293. Id. T 70. The amount of indemnification to be paid by the Government of
Suriname was set at the equivalent of $10,000.
294. Conversely, it appears that any admission by the government, no matter
how general, may serve as adequate evidence of the truth of the allegations, which
may also discourage governments from offering information to the Court. In
Chunima, the plenary Court, meeting after its President had already ordered Guate-
mala to take emergency measures, found that the Commission did not have a rea-
sonable basis for assuming that the facts of the petition for provisional measures
were true. See Chunima Case, (Provisional Measures), Aug. 1, 1991 Order the Inter-
Am. C.H.R., reprinted in 1991 INTER-AM. Y.B. HuM. RTS. 1118, 1124, $ 6. Despite
the Commission's apparent lack of a basis for requesting provisional measures, the
Court found that the President's order was properly adopted. Id. The Court based
this determination on the "blanket acknowledgement" by the government that for the
last thirty years there had been an "internal armed conflict" which resulted in the
occurrence of violent acts in the Chunima area. The Court found that this statement
led to the "presumption that a situation exists which could bring about irreparable
damage to persons." Id. at 1126, T 8. Of course, violence in an area can result in
irreparable damages to persons in general. However, this should not constitute ade-
quate proof that there exists the necessary gravity and urgency of irreparable dam-
age to particular persons which is required for a Court order of provisional mea-
sures. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 63(2). If this general acknowledge-
ment by the government is truly sufficient evidence to give rise to an order for
provisional measures, then in the future the facts of any request for provisional
measures arising in the highlands of Guatemala and in any other conflicted area in
Latin America should be presumed to be true, thus weakening, rather than strength-
ening the standard. Even more damaging, it encourages governments to refrain from
submitting any information to the Court for fear that such information will be used
against it. In Chunima, Guatemala not only commented on its internal situation but
expressed a willingness to comply with the President's order of urgent measures,
and had taken effective steps to put the order into effect. See Chunima Case. Such
compliance by state parties should be encouraged.
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V. EFFECTIVENESS OF AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
COURT
An international human rights court may have both formal
and informal positive effects on its regional human rights situa-
tion. Formally, the contentious judgments, advisory opinions,
and provisional measures ordered by a court protect human
rights and develop legal principles that advance international
human rights law. Informally, a mere summons to appear before
an international court has been shown to have a chilling effect
on human rights abuses within the summoned state. To date,
human rights courts have not succeeded uniformly in minimiz-
ing human rights abuses. Nonetheless, as explained by Judge
Buergenthal, "[e]ven some success in the international human
rights field, however small, will make this world a little better
place to live in. And that, after all, is what law is all about."295
A. Formal Effectiveness of the Inter-American Court to Date
The effectiveness of the Inter-American Court provides an
example of the potential value of regional human rights courts.
Although the Court has decided few contentious cases to date,
there is evidence of its moderate successes. Governments called
before the Court have uniformly attended the public hearings
and presented their arguments. 9' Recently, two governments
officially accepted responsibility for violations of the Convention.
In Aloeboetoe Suriname admitted its liability,29 ' and in El
Amparo Venezuela accepted international responsibility for its
acts."'
295. Buergenthal et al., supra note 28, at 383 (quoting Remarks by Thomas
Buergenthal, American Society of International Law, Annual Meeting, April 24, 1981,
Proceedings).
296. This is in contrast to the ICJ, where in at least the majority of requests
for provisional measures, the respondent has failed to appear and the Court has
made a decision ex parte. See generally, JEROME B. ELKIND, NONAPPEARANCE AND
DISAPPEARANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: FUNCTIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1984).
Although governments in the inter-American system have at times requested
postponements of the hearings, when their requests have been denied they have
complied with their obligations to appear and present their positions. See, e.g.,
Chunima Case, (Provisional Measures), 1991 Order of the Inter-Am. C.H.R., reprinted
in 1991 INTER-AM. Y.B. HuM. RTS. 1118, 1122, 4.
297. Aloeboetoe Case, (Reparations), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 15 (1993).
298. El Amparo Case (Venezuela), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, 9 4 (1995) (on file
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In the Honduran cases, where the Court determined that
Honduras was responsible for the disappearance of at least two
of the victims, the Government has finally committed to pay the
full amount of the court-ordered reparations.299  Also, in
Aloeboetoe, the government of Suriname has reportedly paid the
first installment of reparations.0 °
The Court has been most successful with provisional mea-
sures. Governments have made an effort to comply with the
initial orders of urgent measures made by the President of the
Court, and with the orders for provisional measures taken by
the full Court. In both Chunima and Bustios-Rojas, the persons
designated for protection by the Court were not harmed.3"' In
addition, the government of Argentina complied so completely
with the President of the Court's order of urgent measures in
Reggiardo-Tolosa that the plenary Court did not need to order
provisional measures. In Reggiardo-Tolosa, the Grandmothers of
the Plaza de Mayo filed a complaint with the Inter-American
Commission requesting the return of male twins to their biologi-
cal family." 2 The twins were born in 1977 during the illegal
and clandestine imprisonment of their mother, in the midst of
Argentina's "dirty war."0 3 Immediately after their birth, the
with author).
299. On February 10, 1995, at a ceremony at the seat of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the government of Honduras presented Judge Thom-
as Buergenthal, as representative of the Court, with a letter of commitment to pay
the remaining amount owing to the families of the victims.
Honduras had made the initial payment to the survivors. It had, however,
delayed that payment beyond the date set by the Court. Before payment was made,
a devaluation of Honduran currency reduced the purchasing power of the sum.
Velfisquez Rodriguez Case, (Interpretation), Ser. C., No. 9 (1990). At the request of
the Commission, the Court issued an interpretation of the reparations judgment, in
which it held, inter alia, that Honduras had to compensate the families of the vic-
tims for the losses caused by the delays in payment. Id. at res. 4. Honduras delayed
payment of the additional sum for over four years. See also VelAsquez Rodriguez
Case, (Compensatory Damages), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. C, No. 7 (1988); Godinez-
Cruz, (Compensatory Damages), Ser. C., No. 8 (1989).
300. Victor Rodriguez, Eficacia Juridica de la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Inter-
Americana de Derechos Humanos, in LA CoRTE Y EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANA DE
DERECHOS HUMANOS 459, 469 (1994).
301. See, e.g., Chunima Case, (Provisional Measures), Aug. 1, 1991 Order of the
Inter-Am. C.H.R., reprinted in 1991 INTER-AM. Y.B. Hum. RTS. 1118; Bustios-Rojas
Case, (Provisional Measures), Order of the Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report of the
Inter-Am. C.H.R. (1990).
302. Request for Provisional Measures involving Argentina, (Reggiardo-Tolosa
Case), Case 10.959, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R. (1993), reprinted in Annual Report of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights 92 (1993).
303. Theo Van Boven, Report to the U.N. on the Prevention of the Disappearanc-
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boys were appropriated by a police officer and registered as his
natural children. This officer was formally accused of torture,
rape, and murder by former victims.3 Although the natural
parents of the boys remain disappeared, the biological relatives
fought for the boys' return through the Argentine courts for
many years. In response to the request for provisional measures,
the acting President of the Court ordered the government of
Argentina to take all measures necessary to protect the well-
being of the boys and to provide a full report to the Court. 5
Argentina responded that the domestic courts had ordered the
children into substitute custody and that they were then living
with their biological uncle."° Thus, there was no further need
for the Court's consideration.
In another example, governmental compliance with a re-
quest for provisional measures was far too literal. In the Hondu-
ran cases, two witnesses before the Court received death threats
upon their return to Honduras. When the President of the Court
requested that Honduras protect these particular witnesses, the
government agreed to guarantee their safety.307 Those two wit-
nesses were not harmed. However, three other witnesses who
had appeared before the Court or were scheduled to give evi-
dence were subsequently murdered.0 8 These victims had not
been named in the president's communication with the govern-
ment.3
By means of its advisory opinions, the Inter-American Court
has given effective "judicial expression to certain principles that
are basic to the development of the international law of human
rights."10 The highest courts of the states parties to the Con-
es of Children in Argentina, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 40th Sess., 8,
E/CN.4/Sub2/1988/19 (1988).
304. Carlos Ernesto Rodriguez, Los Crimenes Impunes del Comisario Miara,
MADRES DE LA PLAZA DE MAYO, May 1989, at 20.
305. Resolution of the President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
(Reggiardo-Tolosa Case), Provisional Measures Requested by the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights in the matter of The Republic of Argentina, Nov. 19,
1993, reprinted in the Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
95-8 (1993).
306. Note of the Government of Argentina, (Reggiardo-Tolosa Case), Dec. 20,
1993, reprinted in Annual Report of the Inter-American Court 99-100 (1993).
307. Velbsquez Rodriguez Case, (Preliminary Objections), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser.
C, No. 13, 39 (1987).
308. Id. 40-1.
309. Id.
310. Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights
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vention have, in some recent cases, relied on the Court's advi-
sory opinions in upholding rights guaranteed by the Convention.
The Costa Rican Supreme Court Constitutional Chamber recent-
ly nullified a domestic law that the Inter-American Court had
found incompatible with the American Convention." The law
required the compulsory membership of journalists and report-
ers in an association and limited membership in the association
to university graduates specializing in certain fields."' The In-
ter-American Court unanimously held that the law was incom-
patible with freedom of expression under article 13 of the Con-
vention, as it denied "any person access to the full use of the
news media as a means of expressing opinions or imparting in-
formation."313 The Constitutional Court reiterated the reason-
ing of the Inter-American Court and nullified the law.3 4 The
Costa Rican Constitutional Chamber also declared, in accor-
dance with an Inter-American Court advisory opinion,15 that a
state law on nationalization of spouses could not be read to dis-
criminate on the basis of gender."6
In 1992 the Argentine Supreme Court held that the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights created a directly enforceable
right of reply in Argentina. 1 In doing so, it relied on an advi-
Court, supra note 57, at 25.
311. Acci6n de Incost, No. 421-S-80, Roger Ajun Blanco, Art. 22 Ley Org. Col. de
Periodistas, Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia (May 9, 1995) (Cos-
ta Rica). Other states have not necessarily revised their internal laws to correspond
with the Court's advisory opinions. Latin American states, for instance, continue to
have laws which authorize the derogation of the right of habeas corpus during a
state of emergency. This practice ignores two advisory opinions interpreting the
American Convention as prohibiting the suspension of habeas corpus. See Advisory
Opinion, Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, Inter-Am. C.H.R., supra note
143; Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, supra note 30.
312. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Prac-
tice of Journalism (arts. 13, 29 of American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory




315. Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution
of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Jan. 19, 1984.
316. Expediente 2965-S-91, Voto: 3435-92, Ricardo Fliman Wargraft v. Director y
Jefe de la Secci6n de Opciones y Naturalizaciones, Sala Constitucional de la Corte
Suprema de Justicia (Nov. 11, 1992) (Costa Rica) (on file with the author).
317. Thomas Buergenthal, International Tribunals and National Courts: The
Internationalization of Domestic Adjudication, in RECHT ZWISCHEN UMBRUCK UND
BEWAHRUNG FEsTscHR]Fr FUR RUDOLF BERNHARDT 687, 695 (1995) (citing
Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, Case No. E. 64. XXIII, (Arg., CSJN, 1992)).
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sory opinion of the Inter-American Court which held that the
right to reply was self-executing in state parties under the
American Convention.31
B. Informal Effectiveness of the Inter-American Court
A lesser known effect of the Court's consideration of a mat-
ter is the positive prejudgment effects it may have on a particu-
lar case, or on the overall human rights situation in the state
involved. In repeated instances, referral of a case to the Court,
or the Court's scheduling of a public hearing has brought about
positive action within the state involved.
The referral of a case to an international court focuses inter-
national attention on the situation, and the publicity often cur-
tails some abuses even before the Court reaches a judgment.3"9
Most states are surprisingly sensitive about their international
reputations and world image. According to a former United
States representative to the U.N. Commission of Human rights,
"[d]espite the harsh realities of power politics, world opinion is a
force to be reckoned with. Governments devote much time and
energy, both in and out of the U.N., to defending and embellish-
ing their own human rights image and demeaning that of oth-
ers." 20 For example, agents of the Argentine government re-
portedly disappeared some nine thousand people during the
"dirty war."2 l Concerned by negative publicity, the Argentine
government hired a high-powered New York public relations
firm to improve its international image.3" The threat of nega-
Article 14(1) of the American Convention provides:
Anyone injured by inaccurate or offensive statements or ideas disseminat-
ed to the public in general by a legally regulated medium of communica-
tion has the right to reply or to make correction using the same commu-
nications outlet, under such conditions as the law may establish.
American Convention, supra note 11.
318. Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Correction, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Adviso-
ry Opinion OC-7/86, Ser. A, No. 7 (1986).
319. Adverse international publicity has often proven to be an effective tool in
curtailing human rights violations. Tom J. Farer, The OAS at the Crossroads: Hu-
man Rights, 72 IOWA L. REV. 401, 403 (1987). ("Exposure, or the threat thereof, has
accomplished a mitigation of barbarity in many identifiable instances throughout the
Western Hemisphere"). Id.
320. Dr. Morris Abram, The U.N. and Human Rights, 47 FOREIGN AFF. 363, 371
(1969).
321. NUNCA MAS, supra note 131, at 479.
322. Weissbrodt & Bartolomei, supra note 89, at 1030 (citing Omang, Argentina
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tive publicity is a persuasive force, and can compel governments
to comply with international human rights norms.3"
An example of such governmental compliance took place at
a public hearing on an advisory opinion request to the Court
concerning the legality of extensions to the death penalty, a
situation involving Guatemala. 24 In 1982, following a military
coup by General Efriam Rios Montt, Guatemala established
special courts to combat subversion. 25 These Courts of Special
Jurisdiction met in secret and did not provide even minimum
due process guarantees to defendants.326 The government also
extended the death penalty to crimes which were not punishable
by death at the time Guatemala ratified the American Conven-
tion.327 Guatemala executed those defendants found guilty."~
Despite pleas from the Inter-American Commission and from
Pope John Paul II, who was about to visit, Guatemala went
forward with the executions." Guatemala had not accepted
the Court's jurisdiction, and thus could not be brought before it
in a contentious case. Nevertheless, the Commission sought an
advisory opinion from the Court.330 Guatemala objected to the
admissibility of the advisory opinion petition,"' but attended
the public hearing on the matter. Surprisingly, at the hearing
Guatemala announced the suspension of the executions,3 2
which were never resumed. Apparently the public exposure
Hires U.S. Company to Improve Image, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1976, at A9).
323. See Nanette Dumas, Note, Enforcement of Human Rights Standards: An In-
ternational Human Rights Court and Other Proposals, 13 HASTINGS INTL & COMP.
L. REv. 585, 607 (1990). "Embarrassment and the threat of embarrassment" are
perhaps the principal tools currently in use to prevent human rights abuses. David
Weissbrodt & Teresa O'Toole, The Development of International Human Rights Law,
in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1948-1988: HUMAN RIGHTS, THE
UNITED NATIONS AND AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 17, 25 (Am. Int. ed., 1988).
324. Restrictions to the Death Penalty, supra note 231.
325. Charles Moyer & David Padilla, Executions in Guatemala as Decreed by the
Courts of Special Jurisdiction in 1982-83: A Case Study, 6 HuM. RTS. Q. 507, 508
(1984).
326. Id.
327. Id. Article 4(2) of the American Convention, supra note 11, deals with the
right to life and provides in part: "[tihe application of such punishment [the death
penalty] shall not be extended to crimes to which it does not presently apply." Id.
328. Moyer & Padilla, supra note 325, at 509.
329. Id. at 511.
330. Restrictions to the Death Penalty, supra note 231. Advisory opinions are
not binding.
331. Id. % 11.
332. Moyer & Padilla, supra note 325, at 516, 520.
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caused by the Court's consideration of the issue resulted in this
change of policy.
Another impressive instance of government compliance was
announced at the public hearing on provisional measures in
Chunima. There, Guatemala made the surprise announcement
that it had already arrested and imprisoned the civil patrol
leaders charged with murdering the human rights monitors."
Furthermore, in Argentina the government recently released a
prisoner after the Commission referred his case to the Court.
33
In Honduras, the activity of the death squads dropped precipi-
tously when the Commission referred the disappearance cases to
the Court.
335
VI. STATE MEANS OF LIMITING THE POWER OF THE SYSTEM
Human rights treaties are based on the principle that gov-
ernments respect the rule of law and act in good faith.3 6 Many
states, however, ratify human rights treaties because it makes
good propaganda.337 In reality, many of these states are reluc-
tant to limit their sovereignty by granting any international
body the power to effectively supervise their domestic behav-
338ior. Consequently, while appearing to support an interna-
tional system, states may use more covert means to undermine
the system's force.
A. Financial Strangulation of the Commission and the
Court
A regional human rights system must provide adequate
financing of its enforcement organs if they are to be effective. In
the inter-American system, states have successfully restricted
333. Chunima Case, (Provisional Measures), Aug. 1, 1991 Order of the Inter-Am.
C.H.R., reprinted in 1991 INTER-AM. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 1118, 1122, 1 X
334. Caso Maqueda, Resolution of the Inter-American Court, Jan. 17, 1995 (on
file with the author).
335. James LeMoyne, Testifying to Torture, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1988, (Maga-
zine), at 45.
336. MEDINA QUIROGA, supra note 75, at 316.
337. Thomas Buergenthal, The Human Rights Revolution, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 3,
8 (1991).
338. Id. at 8.
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such financing, and have, thereby, limited enforcement of hu-
man rights. The OAS sets the budgets of the Commission and
the Court, and both budgets are so constricted that institutional
functioning is inhibited."9 One result of the Court's limited
budget is that it cannot always afford to convene public hearings
on a timely basis. As more contentious cases and requests for
provisional measures and advisory opinions are being referred,
the Court's inability to hold more sessions is developing into a
serious problem. Since its creation, the Court has functioned on
a part-time basis. On average it has held two, and sometimes
three, two-week sessions per year.340 The judges, who generally
live and work in their countries of residence, must travel to the
seat of the Court in San Jos, Costa Rica for sessions." In the
years immediately following its inception, the periodic meetings
of the Court were sufficient to handle its light caseload. In its
first ten years, the Court issued only twelve advisory opinions
and decided three joined contentious cases." The recent in-
crease in the number of cases, however, is making such periodic
meetings inadequate. For instance, in 1993 the Court considered
five contentious cases, three requests for provisional measures,
339. For example, the proposed 1994-95 budget for the Court was less than that
proposed for Americas Magazine. Organization of American States, Proceedings, Vol.
1, 23rd Sess., Managua, Nicaragua, June 7-11, 1993, OEA/Ser. P/XXIII.O.2, Sept. 30,
1993, Court Budget 84-85.
340. Regulations of the Court, art. 11 (1991). In addition, the Court may meet
for special sessions.
341. Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, art. 16, reprinted in
BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 11, at 133, 138. Most of the judges, who are paid
emoluments, per diem, and travel allowances when the Court is in session, have full
time positions in their countries of residence.
As explained by Dunshee de Abranches, a renowned legal scholar of interna-
tional law and the inter-American system:
Even though they are not required to live in the place where the Court
has its permanent seat, the judges must be at the disposal of the only
jurisdictional organ of the OAS, particularly for the urgent and serious
cases requiring provisional measures that the Commission can request
from the Court in crisis situations, which arise so frequently in the lives
of the American peoples.
Dunshee de Abranches, supra note 43, at 96.
342. See General Information of the Court, issued by the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights (on file with the author). Only the Commission or a state may re-
fer a case to the Court. In the first years of the Court's operation the Commission
chose not to refer cases to the Court. This bottleneck has now been broken, and the
inter-American system is functioning as was expected under the American Conven-
tion. Thomas Buergenthal, Human Rights in the Americas: View from the Inter-Amer-
ican Court, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 303, 309-10 (1986).
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and two requests for advisory opinions. 3"' If the inter-American
system is to have a more influential effect on human rights in
the Americas, many more cases should come before the Court.
Should the caseload continue to increase as circumstances indi-
cate, the Court will need to convene more often, perhaps eventu-
ally on a full-time basis.3" Neither of these alternatives, how-
ever, is a possibility under the current budget.3"
The Court has adjusted its operations to partially compen-
sate for its limited funding. The Court's Rules of Procedure pre-
viously required that it be called into special session whenever
the Commission made a request for provisional measures. This
was financially impossible if there were many requests.' The
rules now provide that the plenary Court will consider the re-
quest at its next regular session.347 In the meantime, the presi-
dent, in consultation with the Permanent Commission, can call
upon the involved government "to adopt the necessary urgent
measures and to act in such a way as to permit any provisional
measures subsequently ordered by the Court. .. to have the
requisite effect."3'
Another problem is that the enforcement organs lack the
funding to hire enough lawyers to process the cases and assist
the Commissioners and Judges with basic legal analysis.3'
Neither the Court nor the Commission has sufficient legal staff
to research all the important issues raised by a case. Conse-
quently, the Court relies on amicus briefs, submitted by volun-
tary organizations or by other states, to supplement the legal
research of its few lawyers.35 The Court has also allowed the
343. See General Information of the Court, supra note 342.
344. Under Protocol 11 to The European Convention, the European Court of
Human Rights will become a permanent court. Protocol 11, art. 19., reprinted in 15
HUM. RTS. L.J. 81, 87 (1994).
345. The Court's draft statute originally envisioned a permanent court with full-
time judges. The General Assembly of the OAS found this proposal unjustified until
such time as the Court would have a substantial caseload. Thomas Buergenthal, The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 76 AM. J. INViL L. 231, 232-33 (1982) (citing
draft statute OEA/Ser.P, AG/doc.1112/79, Oct. 10, 1979, arts. 20, 22).
346. Article 24(3) of the Rules of Procedure was modified at the Court's Twenty-
Seventh Regular Session in January, 1993.
347. Id. art. 24(4).
348. Id.
349. Judge Sonia Picado, The Role of a Court of Human Rights: Perspectives for
the Future, Address Before the Annual Meeting of the International Institute of
Human Rights, Strasbourg, France (June, 1992) (transcript on file with the author).
350. Although the Convention says nothing about whether the Court can accept
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Commission to name legal advisors for the victims or their fami-
lies, who assist the Commission in preparing a case. Further-
more, as stated earlier, the Commission has established the In-
ter-American Human Rights Foundation to encourage the par-
ticipation of pro bono attorneys.
Increasing the sessions of the Court and the Commission
and augmenting their legal staff will require a corresponding in-
crease in financing. Unfortunately, the OAS is in a continual
fiscal crisis which shows no signs of diminishing.35 ' If the OAS
cannot increase its resources, it should reevaluate its spending
and eliminate all but the most essential avenues.352 The inter-
American system must have the fiscal ability to promote and
protect human rights.353 The continual violation of human
rights is one of the most severe problems faced in the Americas,
yet this is in no way reflected in the budget of the OAS. Conse-
quently, the budget should be revised."u Currently, the OAS
allocates funding to various social and cultural programs and
studies."s While these programs are certainly valuable, their
impact must be compared to that of the work of the Inter-Ameri-
can Court and Commission's monitoring of human rights in the
Americas. Most, if not all, social and cultural activities of the
amicus briefs, it is doing so. See Thomas Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the
Inter-American Human Rights Court, supra note 57, at 15-16; the Court's admission
of the amicus briefs is based on Article 34(1) of the its Rules of Procedure, which
states "Jtihe Court may, at the request of a party or the delegates of the Commis-
sion, or proprio motu, decide to hear a witness, expert, or in any other capacity, any
person whose testimony or statements seem likely to assist it in carrying out its
function"; see also Shelton, supra note 107, at 638-40.
351. See Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court and the OAS, 7 HuM.
RTS. L.J. 157, 157-63 (1986).
352. The OAS allocates money to the Inter-American Music Council (U.S.
$260,500 per annum), the Columbus Memorial Library (U.S. $857,100 per annum),
the Museum of Art of Americas (U.S. $400,100 per annum). Organization of
American States, Proceedings, vol. 1, supra note 339. These allocations should per-
haps be eliminated until the Court and Commission are adequately funded to meet
their needs.
353. See Farer, supra note 319, at 401 (commenting that critics have cited the
Inter-American Commission as the main justification for the existence of the OAS.)
354. 48 THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 589,
617, supra note 251 (stating that, "[t]he budget of the Commission should be in-
creased . . . as much as necessary to assure that it operates effectively. If special
contributions are necessary then they should be made.").
355. Organization of American States, Proceedings, vol. 1, 22nd Regular Session,
Nassau, The Bahamas, May 18-23, 1992, OEA/Ser.P/XXII.O.2, June 21, 1992, Court
Budget, 77-88.
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OAS should be dropped or should depend on voluntary contri-
butions. If the OAS hopes to protect human rights in the Ameri-
cas, it should focus additional financing and support on the
Inter-American Court and Commission.
B. Selection of Judges and Commissioners
The effectiveness and prestige of an international human
rights system depends in large part on the caliber of its judges
and commissioners. Any human rights convention providing for
enforcement by a court should provide, as does the American
Convention, that the judges be "jurists of the highest moral
authority and of recognized competence in the field of human
rights."356 Moreover, judges in the inter-American system must
possess the "qualifications required for the exercise of the high-
est judicial functions in conformity with the law of the State of
which they are nationals or of the State that proposes them as
candidates." 57
The Inter-American Court has been graced with the pres-
ence of excellent human rights jurists and scholars whose opin-
ions reflect a depth of understanding of public international law
in general, and international human rights law in particular.
These judges have advanced the jurisprudence in this important
area. Recently, however, some nominations to the bench have
not been of such uniformly commanding quality. Despite the
conventional requirements, there are signs that governments
may, either intentionally or unknowingly, weaken the Court by
nominating judges who lack expertise.358 In recent years, some
356. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 52. The American Convention also
provides that Commissioners must be "of high moral character and recognized com-
petence in the field of human rights." Id. art. 34.
357. Id. art. 52(1). The judges serve in an individual capacity rather than as
representatives of their country. Id. art. 52. The Inter-American Court judges are
elected by secret ballot in the General Assembly of the OAS. Id. art. 53(1). Only
parties which have ratified the American Convention can nominate and vote on
candidates for the Court. Id. Candidates for judgeships need not be from states
which have ratified the Convention. A state party can propose up to three candi-
dates, one of which must be from another member state. Id. art. 53(2). In this way,
Prof. Thomas Buergenthal of the U.S. served as a judge on the Inter-American
Court, even though the U.S. has neither ratified the American Convention nor ac-
cepted the jurisdiction of the Court.
358. See Douglas Cassel Jr., Somoza's Revenge: A New Judge for the Inter-Aneri-
can Court of Human Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. L.J. 137 (1992) (condemning the election
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nominations seemed based on cronyism rather than qualifica-
tions."9 Politics may also play a role in the elections, as cer-
tain nations have reportedly voted in block to elect a candidate
despite a lack of qualifications."6 The Inter-American Court
has only seven judges,36 ' as compared to the thirty-two judges
currently on the European Human Rights Court."2 With such
a limited number of judges in the inter-American system, two or
three with no expertise in international human rights law could
have a significant negative impact on the jurisprudence and
prestige of the Court. This is also true of the Commission.
Governments must make responsible choices for judges and
Commissioners if these organs are to be considered seriously in
their efforts to protect and enforce human rights. 3 A human
rights treaty, in addition to detailing the necessary qualifica-
tions of judges, might also provide for an inter-state committee
to review the qualifications of candidates for the Court and the
Commission. Such a committee could inhibit any governmental
attempts to undermine human rights efforts by electing unquali-
to the Court of Dr. Alejandro Montiel Arguello, a Nicaraguan lawyer and professor
of international law, who had served as Somoza's Foreign Minister and United Na-
tions Delegate). At the time that Somoza's National Guard was bombing civilian
populations and was involved in widespread summary executions and torture, Dr.
Montiel went before the U.N. General Assembly and claimed that the allegations of
human rights violations by Somoza's government were "totally false," and that Nica-
raguans were "fully exercising their human rights." Id. at 137, (citing the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights
in Nicaragua, OAS Document, OASfSer. IJVII.45, doc. 16 rev. 1, Nov. 17, 1978;
U.N. General Assembly, Official.Rec., Sess. 33, 84th Plenary Meeting, Dec. 14, 1978,
1487-88, I 256, 258, 259 and 261).
359. After much negative publicity and pressure, Argentina retired its nomina-
tion of Carlos Corach, an advisor to Argentine President Menem, who had "no dis-
cernable expertise or record of rights advocacy". Martin Anderson, Human Rights
Nominee has Clouded Past, MIAM. HERALD, Apr. 7, 1994, at All. Corach had alleg-
edly been involved in politicizing the Supreme Court of Argentina and in removing
independent judges from the Courts. Id. Also, the Costa Rican candidate to the elec-
tions in June, 1994, Juan Luis Arias, had no expertise or experience in the area of
human rights. He was defeated.
360. See Cassell, supra note 359, at 139.
361. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 52(1).
362. The European Court has one judge for each member state of the Council of
Europe.
363. Governments must also make responsible choices in nominating members of
the Human Rights Commission. See 48 THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 589, 595, supra note 251, stating that "persons of stature,
with a commitment to human rights, have not always been selected as Commission-
ers or appointed to staff positions, including that of Executive Secretary."
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fled and undedicated judges or commissioners.
VII. CONCLUSION
Developing regions, and even the European human rights
system, can learn valuable lessons from the advances in human
rights law made in the inter-American system. The social, eco-
nomic, and cultural circumstances of Latin America, including
widespread poverty, illiteracy, inadequate domestic administra-
tion of justice systems, and indigenous populations with diverse
languages and customs, has required the development of an en-
lightened approach to human rights protection. This approach
has relevance in many parts of the world. The American Con-
vention allows for such innovations as the individual right to
petition, the right of non-governmental organizations to petition
on behalf of the victims, and judicial guarantees as non-
derogable rights in times of emergency.
Some Latin American governments, in efforts to consolidate
power, have committed gross and systematic violations of human
rights. Such violations include large-scale disappearances and
the elimination of evidence in order to avoid liability. The Court
has consequently developed a jurisprudence which balances the
issues of state sovereignty with the effective protection of an
individual's human rights. Although the Court has ingeniously
walked this tightrope in many instances, it has, at times, not
gone as far as could be desired, and recently appears to be back-
tracking. Still, the inter-American system effectively promotes
and protects human rights. At present, however, states appear
to be reining in the system with financial strangulation and the
nomination of unqualified judges and commissioners. These
limitations on the future effectiveness of the inter-American
system must be halted.
The problems of the inter-American system, although not
universally shared by the majority of Western European states,
have their counterparts in Africa, some parts of Asia, and in
Eastern Europe. The lessons learned and the jurisprudence
developed in the inter-American system have already had a posi-
tive effect on Latin America. If adapted, they may prove very
beneficial in other areas of the world.
